Hostname: page-component-797576ffbb-jhnrh Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2023-12-06T01:25:54.049Z Has data issue: false Feature Flags: { "corePageComponentGetUserInfoFromSharedSession": true, "coreDisableEcommerce": false, "useRatesEcommerce": true } hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Persistence and Determination1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 June 2008

Katherine Hawley
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Roughly speaking, perdurantism is the view that ordinary objects persist through time by having temporal parts, whilst endurantism is the view that they persist by being wholly present at different times. (Speaking less roughly will be important later.) It is often thought that perdurantists have an advantage over endurantists when dealing with objects which appear to coincide temporarily: lumps, statues, cats, tail-complements, bisected brains, repaired ships, and the like. Some cases – personal fission, for example – seem to involve temporary coincidence between objects of the same kind. Other cases – a cat and its flesh, a statue and its lump – seem to involve objects of different kinds.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 62 , July 2008 , pp. 197 - 212
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2008

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Balashov, (1999): ‘Relativistic Objects’, Noûs, 33: 644–662.Google Scholar
Balashov, (2000): ‘Persistence and Space-Time: Philosophical Lessons of the Pole and Barn’, Monist, 83: 321–40.Google Scholar
Bennett, Karen (2004): ‘Global Supervenience and Dependence’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 68: 501–29.Google Scholar
Black, Max (1952): ‘The Identity of Indiscernibles’, Mind, 61: 153–164.Google Scholar
Effingham, Nikk (2007): On the Restricted Composition of Material Objects, University of Leeds Ph.D. thesis.Google Scholar
Gibson, Ian and Pooley, Oliver (2006): ‘Relativistic Persistence’, Philosophical Perspectives 20: 157–196.Google Scholar
Hawthorne, John (2006): ‘Three-Dimensionalism’, in his Metaphysical Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hawley, Katherine (2005): ‘Fission, Fusion and Intrinsic Facts’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 71.3: 602–621.Google Scholar
Hirsch, Eli (2002): ‘Quantifier Variance and Realism’, Philosophical Issues, 12: 51–73.Google Scholar
Langford, Simon (2007): ‘How to Defend the Cohabitation Theory’, Philosophical Quarterly, 57: 212–224.Google Scholar
Lewis, David (1983): ‘Survival and Identity: Postscript’ in his Philosophical Papers vol. 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Lowe, E.J. (2002): ‘Material Coincidence and the Cinematographic Fallacy: a Reply to Olson’, Philosophical Quarterly, 52: 369–72.Google Scholar
Markosian, Ned (1998): ‘Simples’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76: 213–226.Google Scholar
McGrath, Matthew (2007): ‘Four-Dimensionalism and the Puzzles of Coincidence’, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 3, edited by Zimmerman, Dean: 143–176.Google Scholar
Miller, Kristie (2005): ‘The Metaphysical Equivalence of Three and Four Dimensionalism’, Erkenntnis, 62.1: 91–117.Google Scholar
O'Leary-Hawthorne, John (1995): ‘The Bundle Theory of Substance and the Identity of Indiscernibles’, Analysis, 55: 191–96.Google Scholar
Parsons, Josh (2000): ‘Must a Four-Dimensionalist believe in Temporal Parts?’, Monist, 83.3: 399–418.Google Scholar
Quine, W.V.O. (1976): ‘Grades of Discriminability’ Journal of Philosophy, 73: 113–16.Google Scholar
Schaffer, Jonathan (forthcoming): ‘On What Determines What’Google Scholar
Shagrir, Oron (2002): ‘Global Supervenience, Coincident Entities and Anti-Individualism’, Philosophical Studies, 109: 171–96.Google Scholar
Sider, Theodore (2001): Four-Dimensionalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Sider, Theodore (forthcoming): ‘Yet Another Paper on the Supervenience Argument against Coincident Entities’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.Google Scholar
Wasserman, Ryan (2002): ‘The Standard Objection to the Standard Account’, Philosophical Studies 111: 197–216.Google Scholar