Hostname: page-component-7c8c6479df-8mjnm Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-03-29T09:25:19.484Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

A game model of farmers' demand for irrigation water from reservoirs in Southern Spain

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 October 2001

Wietze Lise
Affiliation:
Institute for Environmental Studies, Vrije Universiteit, De Boelelaan 1115, 1081 HV Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
Alberto Garrido
Affiliation:
Department of Agricultural Economics, Universidad Politecnica de Madrid, Spain.
Eva Iglesias
Affiliation:
Department of Agricultural Economics, Universidad Politecnica de Madrid, Spain.
Get access

Abstract

Recent droughts in Spain have triggered interest in behavioural responses to drought risk due to climate change. This paper models the sharing of irrigation water from a joint reservoir as a game between farmers, since farmers' demand comprises the major share of water demands. Empirical data from a dynamic recursive mathematical programming model for three case studies are used to test the hypothesis that the present institutional structure provides farmers proper incentives to minimise their water requirement for irrigation.

The analysis with both an estimated static game and an empirically calibrated repeated game shows that most farmers are unlikely to conserve water used for irrigation purposes. In the case where climate change induces a higher drought risk, incentives emerge for farmers to become conservative in their demand for irrigation water, provided that proper institutional arrangements emerge which protect the share of the water saved by farmers for future use.

Type
Technical Article
Copyright
© Risk, Decision and Policy, 2001

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)