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THE POTENTIAL IN FREGE’S THEOREM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 August 2020

WILL STAFFORD
Affiliation:
DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE IRVINE, 92617 CA, USA E-mail: will.stafford@uci.edu
Corresponding
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Abstract

Is a logicist bound to the claim that as a matter of analytic truth there is an actual infinity of objects? If Hume’s Principle is analytic then in the standard setting the answer appears to be yes. Hodes’s work pointed to a way out by offering a modal picture in which only a potential infinity was posited. However, this project was abandoned due to apparent failures of cross-world predication. We re-explore this idea and discover that in the setting of the potential infinite one can interpret first-order Peano arithmetic, but not second-order Peano arithmetic. We conclude that in order for the logicist to weaken the metaphysically loaded claim of necessary actual infinities, they must also weaken the mathematics they recover.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© Association for Symbolic Logic 2020

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