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MODAL MODELS FOR BRADWARDINE'S THEORY OF TRUTH

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2008

GREG RESTALL*
Affiliation:
The University of Melbourne
*
*PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT THE UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE MELBOURNE, VICTORIA 3010, AUSTRALIA E-mail:restall@unimelb.edu.au

Abstract

Stephen Read (2002, 2006) has recently discussed Bradwardine's theory of truth and defended it as an appropriate way to treat paradoxes such as the liar. In this paper, I discuss Read's formalisation of Bradwardine's theory of truth and provide a class of models for this theory. The models facilitate comparison of Bradwardine's theory with contemporary theories of truth.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2008

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References

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