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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 October 2022



This is the second part of a two-part series on the logic of hyperlogic, a formal system for regimenting metalogical claims in the object language (even within embedded environments). Part A provided a minimal logic for hyperlogic that is sound and complete over the class of all models. In this part, we extend these completeness results to stronger logics that are sound and complete over restricted classes of models. We also investigate the logic of hyperlogic when the language is enriched with hyperintensional operators such as counterfactual conditionals and belief operators.

Research Article
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Association for Symbolic Logic

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