This issue of RoMES has been edited in a national atmosphere of anti-Muslim rhetoric, openly expressed by several candidates during the presidential primaries. Now the election campaign has moved to the appointment, by President-Elect, Donald J. Trump, of cabinet members and close advisors, many of whom share his views of the Middle East and its diverse population. And it does not look good for Muslims in America, including Muslims who are U.S. citizens. Along with Hispanics, African Americans, and Jews, Muslims—and indeed the Middle East as such—are regarded as problems that President-Elect Trump seems intent on doing something about. It is a view of Islam and the Middle East shared increasingly in word and deed by a sizeable and vocal portion of the electorate. What are we to make of the possibility of foreign and domestic policy being crafted by the likes of John R. Bolton, who associates Islam with jihadism and is an admirer of the Islamophobic writings of Robert Spencer? Will there be any tolerance in the new Trump administration of debate and the free exchange of ideas on the need for education about and understanding of the Middle East? The importance of this question relates to the growing population of naturalized and second generation citizens of Middle Eastern origins now living in the U.S. The Middle East is here, and contributing to American culture, religious life, economy, and citizenship.

The legacy of the 2013 Gezi Park protests has been controversial and its impact on Turkish politics difficult to assess. At the same time, there has been little reflection on contemporary Islamic feminist thinking in English sources. This essay argues that one important political and intellectual legacy of the Gezi movement has been the development of certain intersectional discourses in Islamic feminism in Turkey, whereby the shared experience of marginalization felt by pious Muslims, women, ethnic and religious minorities, and the LGBTIQ community has begun to broaden and complicate the scope of Islamic feminist discussions of liberation and social justice. By delineating and linking some important connecting threads of Islamic feminist theological thought in Turkey of the past 30 years, this essay will attempt to summarize key developments in the history of Islamic feminism in contemporary Turkey, demonstrating how they have led to new strands of intersectional feminist thinking in the post-Gezi era of Turkish politics.

The dominance of fossil fuel economies in the Middle East with large Muslim majority populations has led to a recurring question about the role Islamic ethics might play in galvanizing action on climate change. However, the perceived clash of economic values versus environmental norms in Islam deserves more careful examination. This brief article considers the advent of the “Islamic Declaration on Climate Change” which was promulgated in 2015 and considers the tangible steps Muslim government leaders and civil society have taken on this matter. The tangible steps that are being considered with an action plan are discussed in the light of earlier environmental movements within Islam. A brief discussion of environmental norms within Islamic scriptures is also provided to give theological context to this narrative. The establishment of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in the UAE as a treaty-based organization with United Nations affiliations is also considered. The environment can play an important peace-building role in the region as exemplified by organizations such as Eco-peace in Palestine, Israel, and Jordan. Based on the analysis of these developments, it is likely that Muslim countries will continue to play a more proactive role in addressing climate change than they are often given credit for in popular discourse.

The Neoliberal Landscape is a collection of nine essays exploring the economic, political, social, and historical dynamics behind the rise of Islamic political parties in the Middle East, particularly the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) in Turkey. For scholars studying Turkey and the wider Middle East, understanding the rise of the AKP as well as its internal and external undercurrents has been a challenge. On the one hand, its founding leaders marketed their party as a democratic Islamic party, similar to Christian Democrats in Europe, and claimed to focus their efforts on democratizing Turkey by limiting the military and Kemalist hegemony. To this end, they formed alliances with the liberals and the liberal-left as well as the outward oriented business groups, and used the support of the European Union and the United States as leverage to increase their legitimacy. The AKP's strong neoliberal stance in economic policy also allowed it to win over domestic and international capital to its side. The changing times in global politics were also in the AKP's favor, coinciding with the post-9/11 period when the United States and its allies were desperate to find a liberal and democratic Muslim country with a market economy that they could use as a showcase. The AKP project, however, proved to be short-lived as it has increasingly become authoritarian at home, bordering on neo-fascist, and confrontational abroad. In fact, many analysts have suggested that what Turkey is experiencing is nothing short of a regime change, moving the country from a secular republic, albeit a semi-democratic one, to a neo-fascist one-party state with some Islamic flavor, ruled by a strong-man with no pretense of democracy. In fact, since the 7 June 2015 elections, the country has moved to a de facto presidential system, even without constitutional change.