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The industrialization of war*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

Extract

In limited degree, of course, industry and warfare have been connected from the earliest times. Weapons are what make human muscles formidable; and from the dawn of civilization it took specialized craftsmen to make weapons out of metal In the course of time the amount of metal used by warriors tended to increase; and the size of armies may also have grown greater—though with such ups and downs that no very definite growth pattern here emerges before the wars of the French Revolution.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1982

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References

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