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The modal argument and Bailey's contingent physicalism: a rejoinder

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 October 2022

J. P. Moreland Open the ORCID record for J. P. Moreland [Opens in a new window]
J. P. Moreland*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Talbot School of Theology, Biola University, La Mirada, CA 90639, USA
*
Email: jp.moreland@biola.edu
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Abstract

Philosophy is experiencing a resurgence of property (PD) and generic substance dualism (SD). One important argument for SD that has played a role in this resurgence is some version of a modal argument. Until recently, premise (3) of the argument (Possibly, I exist, and no wholly physical objects exist.) has garnered most of the attention by critics. However, more recently, the focus has also been on (2) (Wholly physical objects are essentially, wholly, and intrinsically physical and wholly spiritual substances are essentially, wholly, and intrinsically immaterial.). Andrew Bailey has provided one of the best criticisms of (2) on offer. In what follows, I present and clarify one form of the argument and defend premise (2) by responding to important defeaters proffered by Andrew Bailey and his contingent physicalism.

Keywords

modal argumentcontingent physicalismAndrew Baileyvia negativacategoriesmereological aggregates
Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 59 , Issue 4 , December 2023 , pp. 817 - 835
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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