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Can fictionalists have faith?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 March 2017

FINLAY MALCOLM
FINLAY MALCOLM*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, The University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9LP, UK
*
e-mail: fpmalcolm@gmail.com
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Abstract

According to non-doxastic theories of propositional faith, belief that p is not necessary for faith that p. Rather, propositional faith merely requires a ‘positive cognitive attitude’. This broad condition, however, can be satisfied by several pragmatic approaches to a domain, including fictionalism. This article shows precisely how fictionalists can have faith given non-doxastic theory, and explains why this is problematic. It then explores one means of separating the two theories, in virtue of the fact that the truth of the propositions in a discourse is of little consequence for fictionalists, whereas their truth matters deeply for the faithful. Although promising, this approach incurs several theoretical costs, hence providing a compelling reason to favour a purely doxastic account of faith.

Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 54 , Issue 2 , June 2018 , pp. 215 - 232
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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