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Theistic modal realism and causal modal collapse

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 July 2020

NUNO MAIA
Affiliation:
Mansfield College, University of Oxford, Mansfield Road, Oxford, OX1 3TF, UK
Corresponding

Abstract

Theistic modal realism argues for an extension of Lewis's modal realism capable of accommodating a theistic God. By affording elegant solutions to many atheistic challenges, the view is of great theoretical utility for the theist. However, it has been objected that within a Lewisian framework God cannot be causally efficacious on pain of collapsing intuitively distinct modal notions. In this article I explain why these worries are ill-founded and show how God's existence and causal power over the pluriverse can be consistently understood. If successful, the proposal offers a congenial theistic way to adopt modal realism and address the atheological problems.

Type
Religious Studies Postgraduate Essay Prize
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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