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Contractualism, exclusionary reasons and the moral argument for theism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 February 2022

Aaron Rizzieri*
Affiliation:
Department of Arts and Sciences, Coconino Community College, Flagstaff, AZ, 86001, USA

Abstract

Moral reasons take precedence over non-moral reasons either by outweighing non-moral practical reasons, or by excluding such reasons. Several prominent defenders of the moral argument for theism have incorporated the outweighing thesis. They claim we have categorically binding moral duties only if we always have most reason to be ethical. Furthermore, we always have most reason to be ethical only if theism is true. On the contrary, I argue that the excluding reasons thesis is correct and that this undermines a key premise in moral arguments developed by C. Stephen Evans, C. Stephen Layman, and William Lane Craig.

Type
Original Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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