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La manipulation stratégique des régies de vote : une étude expérimentale *

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Virginie Béhue
Affiliation:
CREM, Université de Caen
Pierre Favardin
Affiliation:
CREM, Université de Caen
Dominique Lepelley
Affiliation:
CERESUR, Université de la Réunion
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Résumé

L'analyse théorique de la vulnérabilité des règles de vote aux comportements stratégi-ques montre que le caractère plus ou moins manipulable d'une règle dépend du concept d'équilibre auquel l'on se réfère. Une question cruciale est de savoir si l'on doit ou non tenir compte des possibilités qu'ont les électeurs de réagir en présence d'une menace de manipulation. Nous étudions cette question à l'aide d'une approche expérimentale. Nos résultats tendent à valider empiriquement la notion de réaction.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2009

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References

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Auteur chargé de la correspondance : Dominique Lepelley. Tel: (33) 2 62 93 84 48. Courriel : .Google Scholar

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