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Beyond the ‘crisis and losers of globalisation’ thesis: Explaining the appeal of One Nation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 June 2018

Frank Mols
Affiliation:
f.mols@uq.edu.au
Jolanda Jetten
Affiliation:
j.jetten@psy.uq.edu.au
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Abstract

There appears widespread consensus that economic downturns and peaks in immigration boost the appeal of populist parties. Economic crises, so the argument typically goes, increase fear and frustration among poor working-class voters. According to this ‘losers of globalisation’ logic, the recent revival of populist parties like One Nation should be attributed the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and a worsening global refugee crisis. At first glance, this logic seems plausible and intuitive. However, recent research has revealed that populist parties can thrive in times of economic prosperity, and attract large numbers of relatively affluent voters. According to this more recent research, support for populist parties tends to follow a V-curve pattern, with such parties attracting both voters who are ‘doing it tough’ financially (relative deprivation) and voters who enjoy above-average levels of prosperity (relative gratification). In this article, we analyse One Nation's performance in the 2017 Queensland state elections from this new vantage point. Although we did not encounter a clear V-curve pattern, the findings nonetheless confirm earlier research showing that ‘income’ is a poor predictor of One Nation support. Discussion focuses on directions for future research, and urges populism researchers to move beyond a narrow focus on crisis, deprivation, and ‘losers of globalisation’.

Type
Queensland election 2017
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2018 

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