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Non-Formal Properties of Real Mathematical Proofs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2023

Jean Paul Van Bendegem
Jean Paul Van Bendegem*
Affiliation:
Vrije Universiteit Brussel, NFWO-Rijksuniversiteit Gent
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Suppose you attend a seminar where a mathematician presents a proof to some of his colleagues. Suppose further that what he is proving is an important mathematical statement Now the following happens: as the mathematician proceeds, his audience is amazed at first, then becomes angry and finally ends up disturbing the lecture (some walk out, some laugh, …). If in addition, you see that the proof he is presenting is formally speaking (nearly) correct, would you say you are witnessing an extraordinary event in urgent need of explanation? Surely, your answer would be yes. But do events of this type actually occur? The matter of the fact is, yes, they do. This paper presents the details of such an event, suggests a possible explanation and examines its implications for our understanding of mathematical practice.

Type
Part VIII. Formal Sciences
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1988 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1988 , 1988 , pp. 249 - 254
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1988

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