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Could Theoretical Entities Save Realism?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Mohamed Elsamahi
Mohamed Elsamahi*
Affiliation:
The University of Calgary
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Extract

Hacking (1983) introduces an attempt to defend scientific realism on the basis of the reality of theoretical entities. This position, which is called entity realism, is based on disconnecting the reality of theoretical entities from the truth and explanatory power of theories that account for them. In this way, two problems can be avoided. First, if theories about theoretical entities are rejected, the entities themselves do not have to go with them and the realist thesis that we can have knowledge of what exists in the world can be sustained. Second, theoretical entities, which will replace theories as the grounds for the realist position, would be protected from attacks on the validity of the inference to the best explanation which underlies classical or “theory” realism. In other words, theoretical entities would be able to survive the collapse of the inference to the best explanation.

Type
Part V. Realism and its Guises
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1994 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1994 , 1994 , pp. 172 - 180
Copyright
Copyright © 1994 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

1

I would like to thank Marc Ereshefsky for very helpful comments.

References

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