Charlie Wilson (D-TX) described his decision to retire from the U.S. House of Representatives as the best of the three options open to him: “To get defeated, to get carried out feet first, or to … start another life” (Gerhart and Groer 1995). Although much research has been undertaken on electoral defeat (Collie 1981; Ferejohn 1977; Jacobson 1992; Mann 1978) and voluntary retirement (Gilmour and Rothstein 1996; Groseclose and Krehbiel 1994; Hall and Van Houweling 1995; Hibbing 1982; Kieweit and Zeng 1993; Schansberg 1994), research on death is still in its infancy. Indeed, rather than staring death in the face, political scientists have buried the issue. In one recent study, for example, mortality is treated as a form of retirement:

Members of the House leave for a number of reasons, most prominent among them being electoral defeat and retirement. Other avenues of departure include death and expulsion. … Simplifying somewhat, we categorize all departures as either the result of electoral defeat or the result of ‘retirement’ (Gilmour and Rothstein 1996, 56).

Of course, some deaths—suicides—are voluntary. However, although many members of Congress die in office, suicide is extremely rare. Accordingly, we caution against treating death as a form of retirement. Otherwise, members of Congress must be presumed to engage in such implausible calculations as the following: “Let's see now. How shall I spend the next few years? I suppose I'll run for re-election. But maybe I should retire so I can spend more time playing golf. Or, since I'm thinking of retiring, why don't I just shuffle off this mortal coil, cross over Jordan's bank to the Stygian shore, pay my debt to nature, and join the choir invisible?”

Twenty-two states have established state legislative term limits since 1990 and several others are considering similar action. Legislative term limits, intended to force a continuous turnover in a legislature's membership, can produce a number of consequences seldom considered in the voluminous rhetorical literature on the subject. Several unanticipated ramifications have occurred in California's political system, for instance, since its adoption of term limits. California's experience suggests that term limits can influence legislators' early retirement rates, as well as the incidence of special elections, and can also produce alternative legislator career paths.

While there is an abundance of conflicting rhetoric surrounding the issue, there is a paucity of empirical research to support the various contentions. Term limit advocates use only theoretical arguments to support their claims that restricting tenure of office makes legislators more sensitive to constituent desires and thus more reflective of public opinion (Jacob 1994). Historical references, but no empirical evidence, serve term limit proponents who suggest that limited incumbent time in office makes legislative bodies more deliberative (Will 1994). Term limit opponents similarly utilize only speculation when arguing that limited tenure of office handicaps effective governing (Cain 1994) and decreases needed policy-making expertise (Eastland 1993; Kesler 1994). None of these claims are supported by reliable, empirically verified data.

In his recent book on the many puzzles of Canadian nationalism, Richard Gwyn (1995, 9) notes that more Canadians (97%) cite their own country as the best in the world than do citizens of any other country. Notwithstanding this coup and the fact that Canada is one of the world's oldest continuously functioning democracies, in an October 30, 1995 referendum, the citizens of Quebec were again asked (as they had been in May, 1980) to vote oui or non on a proposal that would secure the political independence of Quebec. Although Quebeckers rejected the 1980 sovereignty proposal by a three to two margin, the 1995 sovereignty proposal failed by the proverbial eyelash. Why a country described by British writer Jan Morris as “all in all, on the whole, the most admirable on earth” (cited in Gwyn 1995, 51) should periodically appear on the brink of falling apart is a question that has engaged us because of our longstanding interest in the conditions under which democratic political systems are sustained over time.

It can be argued that many of the conditions associated with the emergence and development of a democracy were already obtained in 1867 when the new Dominion of Canada was created by an act of the British parliament. Inter alia, these included a Westminster-model parliamentary government, the rule of law, nascent political parties and free, competitive elections. However, as we have argued elsewhere (Kornberg and Clarke 1992, 12–19), the downside of “Confederation” (as the establishment of the Canadian state is termed) was that it either laid the groundwork for, or exacerbated, many of the national integration problems Canada has experienced.