Shortly before his death in 1971 E. E. Schattschneider said, “I suppose the most important thing I have done in my field is that I have talked longer and harder and more persistently and enthusiastically about political parties than anyone else alive.” Schattschneider's claim is not boastful, but factual. Exactly fifty years ago he completed Party Government, a book that remains a “must” read for students of the U.S. party system. But Schattschneider did more than write books. As Chairman of the APSA-sanctioned Committee on Political Parties, he presided over a debate that resulted in the seminal report, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System. Like Party Government, this also is a “must” read. Evron Kirkpatrick proclaimed it “a landmark in the history of political science as policy science” (1971). Clinton Rossiter said he would “recommend it … to all who are interested in moving toward stronger party government” (1960). Theodore J. Lowi ranked the Schattschneider committee report as “second only to the 1937 President's Committee on Administrative Management as a contribution by academics to public discourse on the fundamentals of American democracy” (1985). William Crotty believed it exercised “the most significant influence on the debate over the operation of political parties that occurred between the Progressive period and the party reform movement of the 1970s” (1980).

The responsible party model has had a long life in part because of the passionate arguments Schattschneider made on its behalf.

This is the 50th anniversary of E. E. Schattschneider's Party Government, that eloquent and influential manifesto, first published in 1942, celebrating party government and popular rule. It is also an occasion to recall one of the pioneers in the profession, and to reflect on his contributions to the development of political science as an intellectual discipline. I have been asked to comment, albeit briefly, on Schattschneider's public philosophy, and, less grandly, on his notion of citizenship and citizen education—a daunting task, at best. I say this because Schattschneider's views are widely known and widely cited, as even a cursory glance at entries in recent editions of the Social Science Citation Index reveals. And he writes in a style that is eloquent and accessible, and leaves little doubt in the reader's mind about where he stands on issues. As a result, any commentary on his views runs the risk of either stating what everyone already knows, or, worse yet, mis-stating it.

E. E. Schattschneider was a self-proclaimed “realist.” It seems an honest label for one whose theory of politics begins with a newspaper report of a fist fight that escalated into a riot and whose ultimate criticism of democratic theory is that those who defined the term never saw a modern democracy in operation. Schattschneider made no pretense of being a political philosopher, yet his hard-boiled practicality seems well-informed by classical political thought. Indeed, his idea of politics is Aristotelian to the core, though recast rather like a Shakespearean play updated in the vernacular, setting, and dress of West Side Story. As such, Schattschneider's politics defy easy categorization in the political science of his time. Widely respected and honored within the discipline, he seems nonetheless a kind of anti-hero—a bit out of step with his peers and skeptical about much of the prevailing “wisdom” in the discipline.

Schattschneider was out of step as well with the reformist politics of his time. A child of Progressivism, he was schooled at the University of Wisconsin and shared the general optimism of Progressives—their passion for social and political engineering, their faith in a democratic politics and an informed citizenry. But unlike most Progressives, Schattschneider was concerned more with politics than with democracy. For him, politics was fundamental; it was the foundation upon which democratic government had to be built.

E. E. Schattschneider's Party Government, published fifty years ago, is one of the early classics of behavioral political science. The enduring popularity of this book, however, stems less from its impressive analysis of the actual workings of American party politics than its advocacy of democratic reform. Party Government was a strong blow in behalf of “responsible party government,” a creed that has had an important influence on political science. Schattschneider later chaired the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association, which produced the famous report “Towards a More Responsible Two-Party System,” published in 1950. Much of the argument of the report was anticipated by Party Government, which advocated “party centralization” to overcome the local and sectional tendencies that defined traditional partisan politics in the United States (Schattschneider 1942; Committee on Political Parties 1950).

Schattschneider considered political parties as perhaps the most archaic institutions in the United States: the American party system continued to operate as it had before the Civil War, that is, as two loose coalitions of state and local organizations, with very little national machinery and cohesion. The major parties were able to control the electoral process and bring people to the polls. Nevertheless, they failed to organize the nominees they elected to office into an effective, cohesive team for control of government. “Nearly all of the conflict and confusion of American government,” Schattschneider (1942, 30) claimed, “can be traced to the failure of the parties on this point.”

With the growth of the federal government's responsibilities during the twentieth century, this failing of the traditional decentralized parties represented a distressing deterioration of representative democracy.

E. E. Schattschneider spent his professional career at Wesleyan University, an institution that prides itself in being aggressively anti-bureaucratic. Given the age we live in, there is doubtless merit in this stance. But there are costs as well. I say this because when asked to provide a bibliographic listing of Schattschneider's publications, I quickly learned that the written record, so essential to any well functioning bureaucracy, was a sometime thing at the University. There was no official file, I was told, either in the central administration or in the University Archives, that contained information on Schattschneider's career at Wesleyan.

But Wesleyan was also a small place during Schattschneider's years—in 1930, the year Schattschneider joined the faculty, the University graduated 93 seniors. And being a small place, it scrutinized closely the comings and goings of its faculty. It did so, among other ways, in an annual publication with the nondescript title, The Mid-Winter Bulletin. Each bulletin listed, albeit sporadically, faculty activities for the previous year. Here one could read about who attended what professional meeting, who lectured at which university, who spoke to which civic group, and who preached at the then mandatory campus chapel services. One also could read about faculty awards and honors, and about faculty appointments to committees, on and off campus.

Fundamental U.S.-West European security and economic relations are being subjected to a thorough re-examination—and potential redefinition—on both sides of the Atlantic. This is occurring as the Cold War is now a topic for historians and as the economies of the 12 European Community (EC) members become increasingly integrated as a result of the EC's 1992 initiative and its ambitious plan for the 1990s. The former Warsaw Pact nations are working to develop stronger economic, political and even security ties with both the United States and Western Europe. The dramatically reduced security threat coupled with strong domestic budget pressures in the United States are leading to a substantial reduction in the American military presence in Western Europe. On the economic front, the EC and the European Free Trade Area are forming a gigantic 19-country free trade area, with the potential of future expansion to include some East European nations. Meanwhile, the United States and Western Europe continue their prolonged deadlock in GATT trade negotiations primarily over the EC's large agricultural subsidies.

The attitudes of European publics toward the United States will play a critical role as European and American leaders sort out their new relationship. Therefore, it is of interest to scholars and policymakers alike to examine the trends in West European public opinion as they relate to America, its policies and its perceived role in the post-Cold War future.

Political scientists should reject Richard Rose's advice in PS (1991) to abandon the use of swing, in favor of his own alternative measures of electoral change, in three or multiparty electoral contests. Given the ubiquity of such electoral contests, this advice has a great potential influence on future election studies. However, a balanced judgment requires subjecting alternative measures to equal scrutiny. This note will do this by bringing relevant evidence to bear on the actual performance of swing and Rose's alternative, as a measure of variations in electoral movements between different areas. The findings are most revealing and in the final section of this note reasons for them will be put forward.

Rose maintains, in his critique of David Butler and Stephen D. Van Beek (1990), that swing can only be meaningfully used as a measure of electoral change between elections where virtually the entire vote is split between two parties. On this basis he claims that “swing is not applicable in nine-tenths of competitive party systems because two parties do not monopolize the vote.” As Rose shows, reliance on swing can ignore important changes in third party votes, which may often be an important determinant of the swing between the two main parties.

The decade of the 1980s began with a former naval officer and Southern peanut farmer, a deeply religious, Sunday-school teaching president being unseated by a former sportscaster and union leader, a divorced and remarried Hollywood movie star-turned-politician. The religious right claimed credit for the defeat of that born-again Baptist, convinced that Ronald Reagan and his Republican party would restore the social and moral values that had crumbled, especially under liberal Democratic administrations. It was a heady period for evangelical leaders, quiescent on the public scene, some say since the 1920s, others say the 1950s. They were concerned again not simply with the salvation of souls but the transformation of society. Mastering the new instruments of television and direct marketing appeals, evangelical leaders had money, organizational moxie, and mass followings. They put their moral agenda into the national legislative arena—and came up with few victories.

The decade ended as ironically as it began. First, “The Fall”: televangelists Bakker and Swaggart were discredited for their moral peccadillos; faith-healer Oral Roberts, for his lack of business acumen. Televangelist Pat Robertson tried for the presidency but discovered that he could not even gain the support of evangelical leaders. Jerry Falwell, who endorsed George Bush rather than pentecostalist Robertson, chose to disband his Moral Majority and emerged with a much weaker, seldom noticed organization.

Racism has been a part of black American heritage for over three centuries. Across the centuries, the systematic discrimination and oppression of blacks has raised barriers to opportunity as well as normality. Racism can take several forms including individual racism, institutional racism and cultural racism. Individual racism is fostered by individuals who categorize blacks as inferior. Even interracial contact under favorable conditions may not reduce this racist outlook. Institutional racism consists of institutions which are conceived as mechanisms to systematically oppress and limit the opportunities of black people. Cultural racism is exhibited by those who would like to homogenize black Americans—making them more white (Jones 1988: 127–31). We expect these forms of racism to have an impact on the political success of black candidates for office.

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, efforts were made at the national level in particular to eliminate barriers to equal opportunity for black Americans. Many whites were unwilling to support full racial equality. The turbulent riots in predominantly black ghettos and the formation of black groups, such as the Black Panthers, spawned fear among some white populations.

Thirty years ago, political activity in the Latino community was relatively unknown at the national level. While there were Hispanic elected officials (HEOs) and Latino community activism, no one spoke of “Latino” politics or the “Hispanic” vote in national politics (Moore and Pachon 1985, chap. 10; Jennings and Rivera 1984). When analysts examined Latino politics, study was confined to the Southwestern states, New York City and perhaps Dade County, Florida. Now, however, Hispanics are one of this country's largest ethnic groups. Hispanics will be the largest ethnic minority group in the nation early in the 21st century (Edmonston and Passel 1991). Consequently, the political life of this community is coming under increasing attention. As examples, see May 1987; Didion 1987.

This overview examines one facet of the increasing Latino political presence—the growing number of Hispanics elected to office at all levels of government. Because the reapportionment and redistricting that will take place in the next two years will increase the number of districts containing a majority Latino population, this discussion is particularly timely. Many newly apportioned districts will elect Latinos to office for the first time. Thus, this overview may be used to assess Latino office holding in 1990 and will serve as a baseline for measuring the impact of post-1990 redistricting on Latino public-officeholding.

Given all the hype in 1990 about an “anti-incumbent” mood that was supposed to have swept the electorate, it is not too surprising that immediately after the congressional elections of that year most pundits claimed to see clear evidence of this mood in the results. But it is surprising that now, as we approach the next election day, more relaxed and objective analysis has not corrected this erroneous view of what actually transpired in 1990. Thus, before this misconception becomes an indelible part of conventional wisdom, and before the events of 1992, which may include something closer to an authentic anti-incumbent mood, are compared to a mistaken view of the events of 1990, we would like to offer an alternative and, we would argue, more accurate interpretation of the 1990 congressional elections.

November 6, 1990 was to have been the day the fortifications of entrenched incumbents—relentless constituency service, massive warchests, and intimidation of prospective quality challengers—were overwhelmed by the poorly-armed but righteously indignant masses. These masses were incited by brave challengers who concocted clever taunts about the insular and haughty denizens of Washington castle life. These hated insiders, it was said, were surrounded by doting courtiers, undeserved privileges, and unbelievable treasures, and the outsiders were finally going to have their revenge.