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How many major US laws delegate to federal agencies? (almost) all of them

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 July 2021

Pamela J. Clouser McCann*
Affiliation:
Sol Price School of Public Policy, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California, USA
Charles R. Shipan
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
*
*Corresponding author. Email: pmccann@usc.edu

Abstract

Delegation is a well-known feature of policymaking in separation of powers systems. Yet despite the importance of this activity, there is little systematic evidence about how many major laws in the United States actually delegate policymaking authority to administrators in federal agencies. Using a database of agency regulatory activity along with text searches, we examine significant US federal enactments from 1947 to 2016 to see which of these laws delegate to agencies. We find that nearly all major laws—more than 99 percent—contain delegation. We also find that the number of agencies receiving delegation in each law has increased over time.

Type
Research Note
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the European Political Science Association

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Clouser McCann and Shipan supplementary material

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