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Do constituents know (or care) about the lawmaking effectiveness of their representatives?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 December 2021

Daniel M. Butler Open the ORCID record for Daniel M. Butler [Opens in a new window] ,
Adam G. Hughes ,
Craig Volden  and
Alan E. Wiseman Open the ORCID record for Alan E. Wiseman [Opens in a new window]
Daniel M. Butler*
Affiliation:
Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri, USA
Adam G. Hughes
Affiliation:
Computational Social Scientist, Seattle, Washington, USA
Craig Volden
Affiliation:
University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, USA
Alan E. Wiseman
Affiliation:
Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee, USA
*
*Corresponding author. Email: volden@virginia.edu
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Abstract

Substantial evidence exists that members of the US Congress vary in their lawmaking effectiveness. Less known, however, is whether constituents are sufficiently informed and inclined to hold their representatives accountable, based on their effectiveness. We conduct two separate survey experiments, informing some constituents about lawmakers' effectiveness and comparing their responses to those with the baseline level of information. We find that voters demonstrate little knowledge of their elected officials' lawmaking effectiveness. When presented with objective and credible information about lawmaking effectiveness, however, respondents express greater approval of more effective lawmakers. Effects are strongest among ideological moderates, but are even pronounced among partisans, who approve of effective representatives of the opposing party, and disapprove of ineffective representatives from their own party.

Keywords

Accountabilitylegislative effectivenessrepresentationsurvey experimentsUS Congress
Type
Research Note
Information
Political Science Research and Methods , Volume 11 , Issue 2 , April 2023 , pp. 419 - 428
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the European Political Science Association

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Supplementary material: Link

Butler et al. Dataset

Dataset

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/5EO10I
Link
Supplementary material: PDF

Butler et al. supplementary material

Butler et al. supplementary material

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