The Ukraine crisis has led to tensions between Russia and the western states and the Arctic is one of the affected regions. Regional cooperation, institutions, and international law are essential for Arctic governance, and the crisis may thus have wide-ranging consequences for high north politics. The present article develops an interest-based model of Arctic conflict spill-over and examines its strength, based on a case-study of the first 18 months of the Ukraine crisis. Three hypotheses for Arctic conflict spill-over are developed: Arctic conflict spill-over will be less severe than spill-over in other regions, the western states will be more assertive than Russia, and the smaller Arctic states will be less assertive than the larger states. A review of the crisis confirms the bulk of these hypotheses with some exceptions, thus demonstrating that an interests-based model holds some merit, while also showing that a complete understanding of Arctic conflict spill-over necessitates a broader approach. The article concludes that conflict spillover is unlikely, but not impossible, in the Arctic.

This paper explores ‘awkward Antarctic nationalism’ and builds on the critical scholarship that explores the contours and contradictions of everyday, mundane, banal and even hot polar nationalisms. The emphasis on ‘awkward’ is designed to draw attention to the resonances and affordances that are associated with Australian polar nationalism in and beyond the Australian Antarctic Territory/East Antarctica. Using the 2016 Australian Antarctic strategy: 20 year action plan as a starting point, it considers how bodies, ice cores and gateways are put to work in order to address a fundamental pressure facing all claimant states. That is how to reassure domestic audiences that claims to territory and access are safe, sovereign and secure without alienating others with whom one wishes to do business within a particular area of Antarctica. More broadly, the paper concludes that both claimant states and non-claimant states are rubbing up against one another in areas such as custodianship, environmental stewardship and polar science and logistics. This has implications for how we interrogate the ideals and practices of the Antarctic Treaty.

In a context of rapid climatic change in the Arctic, the fast melting of permafrost, the decline of glaciers and the melting of sea ice created perceived strategic and economic opportunities for the littoral states. The attention of states beyond the region was also attracted. For example China, without direct access to the Arctic, displays an interest in Arctic research, natural resources, and shipping potential. However, its diplomatic, economic, political and scientific efforts in this region arouse negative reactions among western media. They often draw up a portrait of an ambitious and arrogant China, ready to push aside the sovereignty of the Arctic countries to defend its own interests in the Arctic. From this perspective, it seems relevant to analyse China's activities in the region and to try to assess Beijing's strategy, which seems more driven by opportunism than by a long-term desire to challenge the littoral states’ sovereignty.

Arctic sea ice is melting, slowly but inexorably. As the ice disappears, mankind will be afforded access to regions and activities, including commercial fishing, that have been inaccessible for our entire recorded history. There is currently no regulatory body or mechanism in the high seas Arctic (also referred to as the central Arctic Ocean) to conserve and manage fish stocks, the distribution and concentration of which are poorly understood, and that might be the target of commercial fisheries. This article examines the extent and nature of ice recession in the Arctic, and its likely effect on the accessibility of central Arctic ocean fisheries to commercial exploitation. It then discusses what is known of Arctic fish stocks, both those already extant, and those that might become established or enhanced as a result of changing environmental conditions. It examines international regimes for managing fish stocks that exist either in whole or in part in global maritime commons, and existing fisheries governance mechanisms in the Arctic, and finds them to be lacking. Finally, using the Bering Sea Arctic pollock stock collapse case study as a historical analogue, this article contends that the time is now for putting in place a regional fisheries management organisation to manage and conserve central Arctic Ocean fish stocks.

The field of Security Studies traditionally focused on military threats to states' survival, however, since the end of the Cold War the concept of security has widened and individuals and communities have gradually become viewed as appropriate referent objects of security: Multifaceted challenges facing communities at the sub-state level are increasingly regarded as security threats, including their potential to cause instability for the larger society, thus affecting states’ security. In the Arctic region, a central challenge is that inhabitants are exposed to multiple non-traditional and non-military threats resulting from environmental, economic, and societal changes, which can be understood as threats to human security. We argue that a comprehensive approach to human security overlaps with the concept of societal security, and must therefore consider threats to collective identity and the essential conditions necessary for the maintenance and preservation of a distinct society. We see the human security framework as a suitable analytical tool to study the specific challenges that threaten the Arctic population, and in turn the well-being of Arctic societies. Therefore, we argue that utilising the concept of human security can promote societal security in the context of the Arctic, and in particular, its sub-regions, for example, the Barents region.

Changing environmental conditions in the Canadian Arctic are associated with an increase in marine tourism. A substantial decline in the extent of ice coverage in the summer season has resulted in greater accessibility for all categories of ships, and the tourism sector has been quick to respond to new opportunities. This increase in vessel traffic has raised significant issues for management, and particular concerns about the pleasure craft (non-commercial tourism) sector. This paper reports on research aimed at identifying change in the pleasure craft sector in Canadian Arctic waters since 1990; exploring management concerns held by stakeholders regarding changes in the sector; and, providing recommendations for government stakeholders. The paper is based on material gathered through an examination of existing data sources and stakeholder interviews (n = 22). Analysis was aimed at understanding the rapid development of the sector and potential management strategies, including research needs. Analysis reveals a dramatic increase in annual vessel numbers, particularly from 2010 onwards. Management concerns of interviewees relate to implications of this growth in four areas: visitor behaviour; services, facilities and infrastructure; control; and, planning and development. The paper concludes by describing recommendations in the areas of research needs, regulation, and strategic development.

Persistent organic pollutants (POPs) and their effects on Antarctic seabirds by using excreta as a non-destructive biomonitoring tool have received little consideration. Here we determine the levels of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and some organochlorine pesticides such as dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethanes (DDTs), hexachlorobencene (HCB), heptachlor, and endrin aldehyde in penguin excreta. Animal exposure to these environmental contaminants was determined through porphyrins in penguin droppings. Stool samples of Adélie penguin (Pygoscelis adeliae), chinstrap penguin (Pygoscelis antarctica) and gentoo penguin (Pygoscelis papua) were collected on two locations of the Antarctic Peninsula area: Base O´Higgins (Antarctic Peninsula) and Ardley Island (King George Island). Despite POPs have been banned more than three decades ago, the levels (ng g−1 ww) of PCBs (1.45-2.35), DDTs (1.33-1.76), HCB (0.51-1.70), endrin (0.48-0.71) and heptachlor (0.97-2.40) showed that these pollutants are still present in Antarctica. Porphyrin levels in excreta (4.6-6.7 nmol g−1 dw) were significantly correlated to POPs, indicating certain chemical exposure on penguin colonies that inhabit the Antarctic Peninsula area. The levels of heptachlor found in penguin guano may be affecting some biota in terrestrial sites next to nesting places. Further studies and better understanding of POPs impact on animal performance in Antarctic biota are recommended.

This paper (1) reviews the history of sealing and whaling in the Southern Ocean to illustrate how market demands combined with no or ineffective regulation of catches led to the overexploitation and near extinction of southern fur seals, southern elephant seals and all but one of the Southern Ocean populations of large whales; (2) indicates how the overexploitation and depletion of krill-eating whales led to the Krill Surplus Hypothesis, and the development of the Antarctic krill fishery and the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR); (3) points out how misinterpretation of the reference to ‘rational use’ in CCAMLR Article II(2), combined with consensus decision-making and the potential growth of markets for Antarctic krill, could lead to ineffective regulation of the krill fishery and adverse effects on the krill resource, on recovery of depleted populations of krill-dependent whales, and on other ecologically related species and populations; and (4) identifies reasonable actions that could be taken cooperatively by the International Whaling Commission and the CCAMLR Commission to minimise the risk that the krill fishery will prevent or impede recovery of depleted populations of krill-dependent whales.

On 26 October 2015 the keel was laid for a remarkable new tanker at the Samsung Heavy Industries Shipyard, in Geoje, South Korea, the order having been placed by Sovcomflot, which operates the largest tanker fleet in Russia (Unicom Management Services (Cyprus) Ltd. 2015). The vessel was launched on 20 February 1916 and was named Shturman Albanov (Fig. 1). It is a shallow-draft icebreaking tanker of 42000 dwt (Unicom Management Services (Cyprus) Ltd. 2016) with a length of 249 m and the unusually large breadth for its tonnage, of 34 m, and a loaded draft of 9.5 m. Its ice-class is Arc7. Propelled by two 11 MW azipods (Fig. 2) (Sergey Frank, CEO of Sovcomflot, personal communication, July 2016) Shturman Albanov is capable of a speed of 14 knots. The azipods give it great manoeuverability and the capability of breaking ice up to 1.4 m thick when going ahead and 1.8 m thick when going astern. Registered in St. Petersburg and described as a shuttle tanker, it is designed specifically to haul oil from the Vorota Arktika (Gates of the Arctic) terminal near Mys Kamennyy, the terminal for Gazpromneft's Novoportovskoye field (Sergey Frank, CEO of Sovcmflot, personal communication, July 2016). The terminal is located on the east side of the Yamal Poluostrov, that is on the west shore of southern Obskaya Guba. This water-body is only about 10 m deep in places, which explains the need for a shallow-draft vessel, and for its unusually great breadth, in order to achieve maximum capacity. Another feature dictated by the shallow depths is that it is a bow-loading vessel. It will transport the oil year-round, west via Yuogorskiy Shar or Karskiye Vorota and across the Barents Sea to Murmansk where it will transfer its cargo to the storage tanker Umba. The delivery date for Shturman Albanov was 30 July (Staalesen 2016). In fact delivery and the naming ceremony took place on 20 July at Pusan, South Korea. The ship's captain is Vyacheslav Gafurov (Sergey Frank, CEO of Sovcomflot, personal communication, July 2016).

In the 1920s, Canada developed and promoted a sector claim to the Arctic archipelago based on the 1880 transfer from Great Britain and on subsequent occupation, as expressed in licensing, patrols, and posts. The fact that in July 1909 the government-sponsored explorer J.E. Bernier had claimed the sector by planting a flag, indeed, the fact that Canada had him planting flags at all, complicated if not contradicted this narrative. This research note shows that Canadian government officials of the 1920s misunderstood or, more likely, deliberately mischaracterised Bernier's earlier sovereignty work, and in doing so have distorted our historical understanding of it. The note also argues that, contrary to recent writing in this journal, it is likely that Bernier did not make an earlier sector claim in August 1907.

Some – particularly Australasian – authors who have published in Polar Record may be familiar with the debate around the acceptability of the word ‘expeditioner’. The term is regularly used by Australians and New Zealanders, in both casual and official contexts. In The Antarctic Dictionary, Bernadette Hince (herself Australian) classifies the word as particularly (although not solely) Australian, notes its regular use by the Australian national programme, which publishes an Expeditioner Handbook, and defines it as ‘A member of an [A]ntarctic expedition, including a government expedition’ (Hince 2000: 118–119). However, ‘expeditioner’ appears in the Oxford English Dictionary only as a rare and obsolete term. The sole example cited in the OED Online is from 1758, in a non-polar context; the definition provided is ‘One engaged in an expedition’. Neither The Australian Oxford Dictionary (2nd edition, 2004) nor The New Zealand Oxford Dictionary (2005) includes ‘expeditioner’, although the term is included in the Australian Macquarie Dictionary (5th edition, 2009) and the US-based Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1993). There is clearly significant national variation in the term's acceptability and its use in an academic publication can draw negative attention (Stone 2003: 172 – not coincidentally, a British review of a book by an Australian author). This note argues that ‘expeditioner’ should not be dismissed as an idiolectic ungrammatical term unsuitable for use in British publications. We make a case for the use of ‘expeditioner’ on three grounds: conceptual appropriateness, precedence and convenience of expression.

The price and ISBN in the book review (Turunen, 2014) refer to the hardcover of the book. The price of the softcover is £37.50 with the ISBN 978-0-19-955941-1. We apologise for this mistake.