The recent speculation which I have in view is that which finds its inspiration in the great development of scientific discovery and scientific thought in our day. It would be impossible to range over the whole field. Moreover, the efforts which have been made to frame a comprehensive scheme of thought on the foundation supplied by science are those which are truly characteristic of our time. In recent years, science has been passing beyond the experimental stage, and also beyond the limits which, in former times, made it departmental. The great conception of Evolution, and the intimate linking up of astronomy with chemistry and physics, and of chemistry and physics with physiology and biology, have quite altered our outlook on the universe. The mind of to-day passes from space-time to the electron, and from the electron to the structure of the cell, and from the cell to the living organism, with hardly a jolt. Not that the problems which mark the passage from stage to stage in this series have been solved, far from it; but that the different tages have so much the appearance of closing up into one continuous process that we seem to be approaching a view which will regard the whole as one unbroken development. No wonder that philosophic minds, among students and dreamers speculating on the mystery of the Universe, begin to think that some account of it, based on assured results of science, is becoming possible.

I think it will be generally admitted that if Oxford philosophers have any claim to have added in recent years to the store of our philosophical ideas, it lies in their published works on the theory of conduct. I don’t think it can be claimed that, even in this sphere, they have given us many new and illuminating positive truths. After reading Mr. Ross, Professor Prichard, and Mr. Joseph, we are left, I think, with the impression that the whole subject is much more intricate and puzzling than we should have thought possible. I intend in this paper to try and discover what is true in the theories of these three moralists on one of the most difficult and puzzling of ethical problems, viz., “What Renders a Right Act Right?” Professor Prichard and Mr. Ross, in the main, stand together; it is regrettable that Professor Prichard's published work is so very meagre. And if in quoting from his article in Mind, 1912, on “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake,” I am doing him an injustice in attributing to him any views which he no longer holds, I am sorry; but modesty in publishing has its penalties, and anyhow, the article is too guilty an offender to get off free, for its annoying subtleties started the whole trouble, and led indirectly to Some Problems in Ethics and the Right and the Good.

The conception of entropy came from the theoretical study of the steam-engine, and, neglecting refinements of mathematical treatment, can easily be illustrated. The motive power of the engine comes from the transformation of the heat generated by the combustion of the fuel. The mechanism transforms the kinetic energy of the molecules of heated steam into the kinetic energy of the parts of the engine. Consider a steamship under way: for a brief period of time this can be regarded as an automatic physical system. Some of the heat conveyed by the steam transforms directly into mechanical energy and some passes out into the ocean in the condenser water. We take the latter fraction: in the boiler there is a certain quantity, Q1, at a temperature of, say, 200°C, that is, 473° absolute, and its entropy is simply Q1/473° ab. The same quantity passes out into the ocean where its temperature falls to, say, 10°C, or 283° ab., and its entropy is now Q1/283° ab. Plainly the former quantity of entropy is less than the latter, so that in the transformation of heat into mechanical energy entropy has increased. The conception has been generalized so as to include all forms of energy and all physical transformations, and it can be shown that in all physical events that occur of themselves entropy increases. The conception includes these notions: (1) Available and unavailable energy; (2) greater or lesser improbability of the elements of the systems contemplated; and (3) the physical meanings of before and after.

The proofs offered by St. Thomas of the existence of God suggest a problem. The day is past when the scholasticism of the Middle Ages was scornfully—often ignorantly—dismissed. The intellectual strength of a thinker such as St. Thomas is amply recognized.

Almost exactly a quarter of a century ago—in the year 1906— the George Combe Department of Psychology was established in this University, thanks to the farsightedness of Professor Pringle-Pattinson, who has, to our regret, now gone from among us, and Professor Sir Edward Sharpey Schafer, who is happily with us still, and to the generosity of the George Combe Trustees. In his inaugural lecture, delivered in the old Natural History classroom, my predecessor, Dr. W. G. Smith, discussed the scope and relations of modern psychology. He emphasized the fact that modern psychology had extended its boundaries far beyond the psychology taught in the past in this and other universities, that it now included child psychology, animal psychology, abnormal psychology, physiological psychology, and experimental psychology, all developed studies, and that its growth in importance had been commensurate with its expansion.

In a paper on “Beauty and Greatness in Art” discussed at a recent meeting of the Aristotelian Society, Professor Alexander says: “In Art there are two standards; there is the strictly æsthetic standard, Is the work beautiful or not; has it attained beauty? and there is the question, Is it great or small?… This contrast of beauty and greatness is the old contrast of form and subject-matter.” Here is offered a problem of capital importance and of age-long interest, but alongside of it there is a subsidiary and a much slighter question which has been comparatively little noticed and which may yet have bearing on the larger issue. This question is the relation of actual size, of size-in-itself, to the other factors in a work of art, and the reaction, if such there be, of such a size-factor upon the aesthetic whole.