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The Morality of Killing

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

T. Goodrich
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Extract

At first sight there doesn't seem to be any problem about killing. Most people would say that it is wrong to kill and that's all there is to it. The same opinion is proclaimed by many members of the Christian religion. They say that ‘Thou shalt not kill’ is an absolute command. But there are several issues involving the morality of killing where ordinary men, secular and religious alike, make judgements or evince perplexity which reveals that common sense morality is less clear about killing than it at first appears.

Type
Articles
Information
Philosophy , Volume 44 , Issue 168 , April 1969 , pp. 127 - 139
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1969

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References

1 But this is not the correct way of formulating the conflict. Cf. my conclusions on euthanasia—p. 136.

2 ‘Medical Termination of Pregnancy Bill’, 1966, presented by MrSteel, David, M.P. (in its original form).Google Scholar

3 Jan Narveson deals with this subject in his ‘Utilitarianism and New Generations’ in Mind 1967Google Scholar. It will be seen that I do not follow his treatment. This is because he seems to accept that we can talk of a sum of happiness or suffering. He is led to say that utilitarianism forbids the bringing into the world of children who will on the whole suffer, but does not prescribe bringing into the world children who will on the whole be happy. On my view utilitarianism says nothing about either. It is very difficult to see how it can say something about the one and not the other.

4 Cp. G. E. Moore on pleasure: ‘Our question is: Is it the pleasure, as distinct from the consciousness of it, that we set value on? Do we think the pleasure valuable in itself, or must we insist that, if we are to think the pleasure good, we must have consciousness of it too?’ (Principia Ethica, p. 88).Google Scholar

5 The point in this paragraph has, of course nothing to do with the question of existential import. When I say that ‘All men should be as happy as possible’ presupposes a class of men, I offer no opinion about what should be said if there were no men. Happily we do not have to consider this question, since the class of men is not the null class.

6 Language of Morals, p. 69.Google Scholar

7 In case anyone should think that this difficulty can be surmounted by talking of ‘prima facie’ duties, I should point out that this is not a conflict of duties but a doubtful application of one single duty.