The use of the word “possible” without qualification invariably leads us to the endless, or at least well beyond our finite powers of analysis. Yet, to qualify possibility may itself become an endless task, if only because of the multitude of the available modes of approach. Somewhere in the middle of the realm of possibility one must parachute down and start ordering the scattered riches for our finite purposes with our limited and only newly acquired perspectives. What we have glimpsed of the realms of possibility before our descent may still be of use, but our immediate tasks will bind us to the sternly empirical gravitational pulls of what happens to have erupted in the historical fields of discovery.

This article is an attempt to: (a) outline the essential elements in Alfred North Whitehead's theory of “actual entities“; (b) indicate the erroneous nature of a number of widely held interpretations and criticisms of his speculative scheme; (c) state criticisms which seem legitimately applicable to Whitehead's cosmology.

Whitehead's theory of actual entities can only be understood if one continually bears in mind Whitehead's purpose in formulating this theory and the method which he uses in his project.

It is widely stated that a hypothesis is necessary to the execution of a scientific investigation. However, the dogmatic acceptance of this, as of every other proposition, is to be condemned until its implications have been adequately explored.

It is the writer's view that hypotheses are not prerequisite to every study which contributes to organized and systematic knowledge of the observable world. It is also concluded that the recognition of a problem requiring a solution or a question deserving an answer is a step that must be taken in every sort of systematic study, and, therefore, that a problem is a more important characteristic of scientific method than a hypothesis.

The large number of writers who have in recent years attacked the problem of the logical nature of commands appear generally in agreement in accepting the distinction of common grammar between imperative and declarative sentences as representing, albeit in no clear one-to-one manner, some real difference in the logical character of the two types of expression, and possibly in the psychological sign-functioning mechanism itself. The crucial logical difference adduced is that commands can apparently rot be classified as true or false. One is then, however, confronted with the problem of interpreting arguments involving imperatives which appear syllogistic in form, such as:

Keep your promises!

You promised to pay on Wednesday.

Pay on Wednesday!

The intention and the result of a scientific inquiry is to obtain an understanding and a control of some part of the universe. This statement implies a dualistic attitude on the part of scientists. Indeed, science does and should proceed from this dualistic basis. But even though the scientist behaves dualistically, his dualism is operational and does not necessarily imply strict dualistic metaphysics.