Reductionism is a metaphysical thesis, a claim about explanations, and a research program. The metaphysical thesis reductionists advance (and antireductionists accept) is that all facts, including all biological facts, are fixed by the physical and chemical facts; there are no non-physical events, states, or processes, and so biological events, states and processes are “nothing but” physical ones. The research program can be framed as a methodological prescription which follows from the claim about explanations. Antireductionism does not dispute reductionism's metaphysical claim, but rejects the explanatory claim and so the methodological moral. To a first approximation what reductionists and anti-reductionists disagree about is whether explanations in functional biology can be or need to be explained or completed or perhaps replaced by explanations in terms of molecular biology. And this disagreement over the adequacy of explanations in functional biology drives a significant methodological disagreement with consequence for the research program of biology.

In “The Indeterministic Character of Evolutionary Theory: No ‘Hidden Variables Proof’ But No Room for Determinism Either,” Brandon and Carson (1996) argue that evolutionary theory is statistical because the processes it describes are fundamentally statistical. In “Is Indeterminism the Source of the Statistical Character of Evolutionary Theory?” Graves, Horan, and Rosenberg (1999) argue in reply that the processes of evolutionary biology are fundamentally deterministic and that the statistical character of evolutionary theory is explained by epistemological rather than ontological considerations. In this paper I focus on the topic of mutation. By focusing on some of the theory and research on this topic from early to late, I show how quantum indeterminism hooks up to point mutations (via tautomeric shifts, proton tunneling, and aqueous thermal motion). I conclude with a few thoughts on some of the wider implications of this topic.

Our cognitive capabilities force us into a description of the world by levels. But theories on different levels result in descriptions that differ qualitatively. Therefore, the resulting incommensurability requires ontological bridges between such theories. These are obtained uniquely when the equations of the reduced theory are compared with a suitable limit of the equations of the reducing theory. Four case studies from theoretical physics and astronomy support this claim, two for theories of composites and two for non-composites (field theories). There results a coherent view of a single real world despite its ontological pluralism. The cumulativity of scientific knowledge is thus ensured and realism is supported.

The aim of this paper is to analyze a philosophical question (neutrality vs. theoryladenness of observation) taking into consideration the empirical results of Cognitive Psychology (theories of perception). This is an important debate because the objectivity of science is at stake. In the Philosophy of Science there are two main positions with regard to observation, those of C. Hempel and N. R. Hanson. In the Philosophy of Mind there are also two important contrasting positions, those of J. Fodor and Paul M. Churchland. I will analyze the consequences of recent theories of perception and vision developed within Cognitive Science for classical epistemological theses about observation.

Model simplicity in curve fitting is the fewness of parameters estimated. I use a vector model of least squares estimation to show that degrees of freedom, the difference between the number of observed parameters fit by the model and the number of explanatory parameters estimated, are the number of potential dimensions in which data are free to differ from a model and indicate the disconfirmability of the model. Though often thought to control for parameter estimation, the AIC and similar indices do not do so for all model applications, while goodness of fit indices like chi-square, which explicitly take into account degrees of freedom, do. Hypothesis testing with prespecified values for parameters is based on a metaphoric regulative subject/object schema taken from object perception and has as its goal the accumulation of objective knowledge.

After maintaining in (Sobel 1997) that certain cyclical preferences can be reasonable, the following questions were tabled: “in what circumstances and under what assumptions … these … preferences of George's would turn him into a ”money pump,” and in what circumstances and under what assumptions they would not do that.” (47) Two pumps afford answers. George, who is sufficiently reasonable and well-informed to use backward induction, has, for this reason, nothing to fear from the first pump, but the second, of a nonstandard design by Wlodek Rabinowicz, ruins him just because he is subject to the constraints of backward induction. Could he be helped by extending his options from actions in a single round, to courses of actions starting in that round? Possibly not. He would be safe if he were capable of resolute choices of couses of action. Even so, he is in trouble through no fault of his, if, as I think, not having that capacity, though a misfortune, is not a fault.