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This paper is a critique of Kenneth Arrow's thesis concerning the logical impossibility of a constitution. I argue that one of the premises of Arrow's proof, that of the transitivity of indifference, is untenable. Several concepts of preference are introduced and counter-instances are offered to the transitivity of indifference defined along the standard lines in terms of these concepts. Alternate analyses of indifference in terms of preference are considered, and it is shown that these do not serve Arrow's purposes either. Finally, it is argued that in the single special case in which indifference could plausibly be held to be transitive, Arrow's thesis is innocuous.
The purpose of this paper is to resolve two paradoxes, which occur in quantum theory, by using the discussion of the theory of measurement presented in two earlier papers by the author , , . The two paradoxes discussed will be the Schrödinger cat paradox and the Einstein, Podolski, Rosen paradox . An introductory section will be included which summarizes the relevant results from the author's previous papers. Also a discussion will be made regarding the author's interpretation of the density operator.
This study concerns logical systems considered as theories. By searching for the problems which the traditionally given systems may reasonably be intended to solve, we clarify the rationales for the adequacy criteria commonly applied to logical systems. From this point of view there appear to be three basic types of logical systems: those concerned with logical truth; those concerned with logical truth and with logical consequence; and those concerned with deduction per se as well as with logical truth and logical consequence. Adequacy criteria for systems of the first two types include: effectiveness, soundness, completeness, Post completeness, “strong soundness” and strong completeness. Consideration of a logical system as a theory of deduction leads us to attempt to formulate two adequacy criteria for systems of proofs. The first deals with the concept of rigor or “gaplessness” in proofs. The second is a completeness condition for a system of proofs. An historical note at the end of the paper suggests a remarkable parallel between the above hierarchy of systems and the actual historical development of this area of logic.
Entropy is proposed as a concept which in its broader scope can contribute to the study of the General Information System. This paper attempts to identify a few fundamental subconcepts and lemmas which will serve to facilitate further study of system order. The paper discusses: partitioning order into logical and arbitrary kinds; the relationship of order to pattern; and suggested approaches to evaluating and improving the General Information System.
No other branch of the philosophy of science is as backward as the philosophy of biology. When physicists or philosophers “explain biology,” they not only tend to use wrong terminologies but they usually throw away that which is typically biological. This error is second only to the even worse one of adopting vitalistic interpretations. Vitalism is now dead, as far as biologists are concerned (it seems to survive in the minds of a few philosophers), and a biologist can now talk about the differences between the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of biology without being suspected of being a concealed vitalist.
Professor Meehl  has pointed out a very significant problem in the methodology of psychological research, indicating that statistical tests of psychological hypotheses against a null hypothesis are loaded in favor of eventual success at rejecting the null hypothesis. In my opinion this is not, however, a contrast between physics and psychology, but rather between the method of parameter estimation and that of the null hypothesis in the tradition of Fisher. A physicist could use the null hypothesis method as well as the psychologist. The fact that he doesn't is probably related to the more advanced state of his measurement techniques and theoretical constructs.
Scientific tradition holds that it is essential to permit individual researchers almost complete freedom in their selection of research projects. As a result, structured research planning has not played a major role in determining the course of the sciences. By “structural research planning” we mean the methodical establishment of goals, and the identification of research routines which apparently accord priority to highest value goals, while minimizing the cost and time of their attainment. With increasing competition for limited fiscal and intellectual resources this kind of planning may become more necessary. Let us cite three specific examples: First, the individual researcher is often faced with the question of how best to spend his time in pursuing a particular line of investigation. He must allocate his personal resources of time and talent to work which appears to hold the promise of highest pay-off. Second, on a larger scale, the competition for resources also raises the question of priority among alternative government-sponsored research projects. Individuals proposing equally alluring projects sometimes seek the same funds; government planners need some sort of objective criteria (hopefully based on a rational strategy) in order to judge the proposals. Furthermore, government planners face the problem of justifying their request for “big science” resources; a planning strategy which defines the use and expected output of the requested resources can help in the design and promotion of their concept. Finally, there is a growing sentiment that at least some research should be directed toward the solution of current and anticipated societal problems, to find means of circumventing or minimizing the impact of potentially dangerous problems of civilization. These needs : the choice of individual research, allocation of national resources among competing projects, and selecting research of societal importance, suggest that structured research planning might be valuable.