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The Spirit of Logical Empiricism: Carl G. Hempel's Role in Twentieth-Century Philosophy of Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Wesley C. Salmon*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh

Abstract

In this paper, I discuss the key role played by Carl G. Hempel's work on theoretical realism and scientific explanation in effecting a crucial philosophical transition between the beginning and the end of the twentieth century. At the beginning of the century, the dominant view was that science is incapable of furnishing explanations of natural phenomena; at the end, explanation is widely viewed as an important, if not the primary, goal of science. In addition to its intellectual benefits, this transition has important practical consequences with respect to dealing with the global problems humans everywhere will face in the twenty-first century.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1999 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

Send requests for reprints to the author, Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, 1001 Cathedral of Learning, Pittsburgh, PA 15260-6299.

I am extremely grateful to Philip Kitcher and Peter Lipton for many helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

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