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On Schupbach and Sprenger’s Measures of Explanatory Power

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Michael P. Cohen
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Abstract

Jonah N. Schupbach and Jan Sprenger have proposed conditions of adequacy for measures of explanatory power. They derive and defend a measure of explanatory power satisfying their conditions of adequacy. This article furthers the development of their measure. The requirement that the measure be multidimensional analytic (in the sense of the mathematics of several complex variables) is avoided. Several proofs are simplified, and gaps in proofs are filled.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 82 , Issue 1 , January 2015 , pp. 97 - 109
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I am grateful to three anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions.

References

Crupi, Vincenzo, and Tentori, Katya. 2012. “A Second Look at the Logic of Explanatory Power (with Two Novel Representation Theorems).” Philosophy of Science 79:365–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kemeny, John G., and Oppenheim, Paul. 1952. “Degrees of Factual Support.” Philosophy of Science 19:307–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schupbach, Jonah N., and Sprenger, Jan. 2011. “The Logic of Explanatory Power.” Philosophy of Science 78:105–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar