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Emergents from Fusion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Hong Yu Wong
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Abstract

This is a critical discussion of Paul Humphreys's fusion view of emergence, focusing on the basal loss feature of his ontology. The discussion yields some general morals for special science ontology.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 73 , Issue 3 , July 2006 , pp. 345 - 367
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I am grateful to the editor, Paul Humphreys, Timothy O'Connor, Krisztina Orbán, Paul Snowdon, and Georg Theiner for discussion and comments, and to Michael Martin for valuable advice on restructuring.

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