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Discussion: Ultimate and Proximate Consequences in Causal Decision Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Brian Skyrms*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of California at Irvine

Abstract

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Type
Discussion
Copyright
Copyright © 1985 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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References

REFERENCES

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