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‘True’ and Truth

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Avrum Stroll
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego and University of Oregon
Henry Alexander
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego and University of Oregon

Abstract

In Parts I, II, and III of the paper, the authors show that an argument essential to Alan White's defense of the Correspondence Theory of truth is unsuccessful. They argue that some of the premises of White's argument are false, and others incoherent. They show, further, that certain widely accepted assumptions in the philosophy of language, which underlie White's argument, must also be abandoned. In Part IV, they attempt to say something new about ‘true’, ‘false’, truth and falsity, and related notions. They do not offer a competing theory to White's, but instead stress features of the use of these words and concepts which philosophers have either ignored or insufficiently emphasized.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1975 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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References

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