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Deep Conventionalism about Evolutionary Groups
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
Abstract
We reject a widespread objectivism about kinds of evolutionary groups in favor of a new conventionalism. Surprisingly, being any one kind of evolutionary group typically depends on which of many incompatible values are taken by suppressed variables. This novel pluralism underlies almost any single evolutionary group concept, unlike familiar pluralisms claiming that multiple concepts of certain sorts are legitimate. Consequently, we must help objective facts determine which candidate evolutionary groups satisfy the definition of a given evolutionary group concept, regardless of whether we also help determine the legitimacy of that concept’s applications.
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- General Philosophy of Science
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- Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
For helpful discussion, we thank David Baum, Ken Bond, Kenny Easwaran, Marc Ereshefsky, Laura Franklin-Hall, Luke Glynn, Matt Haber, Andrew Hamilton, Casey Helgeson, Chris Hitchcock, Roberta Millstein, Matt Slater, Elliott Sober, Marius Stan, Jacob Stegenga, Rob Wilson, and audiences at the Philosophy of Biology at Madison 2012 workshop and PSA 2012.
References
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