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Response to Matthew N. Green's review of Pushing the Agenda: Presidential Leadership in U.S. Lawmaking, 1953–2004

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 December 2012

Extract

In Pushing the Agenda, I sought to revisit the basic tenets of presidential coalition building on Capitol Hill. My hope was that tracing the White House's lobbying strategies would not only reveal how they are intended to work but also offer a better blueprint for assessing if they do. To those ends, I theorized that the White House has two basic lobbying strategies—an early game (agenda-centered) strategy aimed at shaping the legislative alternatives considered and an endgame (vote-centered) strategy aimed at determining which prevailed. Tests with a diverse assortment of original data—on the practice of lobbying, the results of key roll-call votes, and the passage of new laws—all corroborated a key point: presidential coalition building operates differently than scholars have thought, with effects greater than previously realized.

Type
Critical Dialogue
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2012

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