A feature of the end of the Cold War has been the tendency in state practice to expand the right of lawful resort to force by introducing novel grounds for the exercise of the right of self-defence. These are an alleged right to use force in self-defence against armed bands, regardless of the precise involvement of another state in their activities and the introduction of a right of pre-emptive self-defence against likely threats to the security of a state. Action by armed bands is viewed as an autonomous instance of an armed attack, while at the same time the alleged right of pre-emptive self-defence marks a departure from the hitherto controversial concept of anticipatory self-defence by dispensing with the requirement of imminence of an armed attack. A factual assessment of ‘imminence’ is replaced by considerations of state security. This tendency in state practice faces the persistence by the ICJ to view the use of force as an inter-state phenomenon and to interpret resort to defensive action as narrowly as possible.

This paper focuses upon a comparatively overlooked issue with regard to the scope of self-defence in international law: whether the subjective ‘psychological’ positions of the states concerned in a dispute involving the use force have any impact upon the lawfulness of an action avowedly taken in self-defence. There exists a long standing conception that the motives of a state responding in self-defence are relevant to the lawfulness of that response. The purity (or impurity) of a state's motive forms the basis of a distinction for many writers between a lawful self-defence action and an unlawful armed reprisal. Similarly, in recent decisions of the ICJ, the implication has been that the subjective intention of the attacking state may be relevant to the question of whether the attack perpetrated by that state can trigger the right of self-defence. The conclusion is reached here that the lawfulness of an avowed self-defence action should be premised upon objective criteria alone. Moreover, this reflects the law as it is in fact applied in practice. It is argued that the subjective ‘psychological’ position of either the responding or attacking state has no place in the final analysis of whether an action in self-defence was lawful or unlawful.

Doctrinal contributions on international law and politics broadly build upon the merits of international criminal justice. This applies especially to the prosecution of international crimes before national courts, which assumes the predominant importance given the limited ambit of jurisdiction of international criminal jurisdiction. A number of doctrinal contributions develop the policy view of these processes, which does not always overlap with the requirements under the international legal standards on this subject-matter. This contribution assesses the general merit of policy approaches, and their relevance in terms of more specific issues, such as universal jurisdiction, amnesties for perpetrators of international crimes, and immunity of state officials. Having analysed the pertinent evidence, this contribution concludes that the policy argument possesses no independent relevance in the legal discourse on international criminal justice, and should not be used in a way that contradicts the international legal argument.

International law has long recognized the right to vote in elections as a fundamental democratic right and the act of voting as the most basic form of popular participation. In post-conflict African countries as well as those struggling to make the transition from single-party autocratic rule to multiparty democracies, competitive elections have become the barometer for measuring how close they are to this goal. Yet, across Africa this internationally-protected right to vote is under siege as elections have been transformed into elaborately staged events designed to hoodwink external donors. Rather than serving as a measure of democratic participation, the act of voting in a disturbingly sizeable number of African countries has been used by cynical political leaders to provide their authoritarian regimes with a veneer of legitimacy. Despite these hiccups, this article argues that a careful review of state practice in the continent reveals an emerging regional customary law norm in support of the right to popular participation.