1. The Declaration on the Progressive Development of Principles of Public International Law relating to a New International Economic Order, commonly called the Seoul Declaration, was adopted by consensus during the 62nd ILA Conference held in Seoul in 1986. The text has been published in the ILA Report of the Sixty Second Conference(1987) pp. 2–12. See also 33 NILR (1986) p. 326Google Scholar.

2. The International Law Commission (ILC) uses the term ‘responsibility’ only in connection with wrongful acts and reserves the term ‘liability’ for injurious consequences arising out of the performance of certain lawful activities. In doing so the ILC has acted on the premise that the English terms ‘responsibility’ and ‘liability’ are facets of a single concept, rendered in French by the term ‘responsabilité’. See Pinto, M. C. W., ‘Reflections on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law’, 16 NYIL (1985) pp. 24–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Cf., the analysis of the terminology (obligation, duty) by Vagts in UNCTL Current Studies Ser. A. No. 2, Sept. 1986, pp. 1–6.

3. Bedjaoui, M., ‘Responsibility of States: Fault and Strict Liability’, in Bernhardt, R., ed., Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Instalment 10 (1987) pp. 358–362Google Scholar.

4. White, G., ‘Legal Consequences of Wrongful Acts in International Economic Law’, 16 NYIL (1985), pp. 137–174, at p. 172CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5. Akehurst, M. B., ‘International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law’, 16 NYIL (1985) pp. 3–17CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6. Barstow-Magraw, D., ‘Transboundary Harm: The International Law Commission's Study of International Liability’, 80 AJIL (1986) p. 305CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7. Zemanek, K., ‘Responsibility of States: General Principles’, in Bernhardt, , op. cit. n. 2, p. 372Google Scholar.

8. Seoul Declaration, s. 10, para. 3.

9. Seoul Declaration, s. 5, para. 3.

10. Seoul Declaration, s. 7, para. 5.

11. Pinto, , loc. cit. n. 1, pp. 44–45Google Scholar.

12. Ibid., p. 45.

13. Ibid., pp. 47–48.

14. A/RES/41/128, 4 December 1986, Art. 2, para. 2.

15. Seoul Declaration, s. 3, para. 3.

16. Absolute poverty is defined as a condition of life so characterized by malnutrition, illiteracy and disease as to be beneath any reasonable definition of human decency. See World Development Report (1980) p. 32.

17. Limburg Principles, para. 72, in de Waart, P., Peters, P. and Denters, E., eds., International Law and Development (1988) p. 434Google Scholar.

18. de Waart, P. J. I. M., ‘Human Rights and International Economic Order: Applying the NIEO Principle Right to Development’, a paper submitted to the ILA NIEO seminar, Islamabad, 03 1989Google Scholar.

19. Handl, G., ‘Liability as an Obligation Established by a Primary Rule of International Law: Some Basic Reflections on the International Law Commission's Work’, 16 NYIL (1985) p. 77CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

20. Ibid., p. 77.

21. Ibid., p. 78.

22. Seoul Declaration, s. 8.

23. Limburg Principles, para. 6, in Waart, De et al. , eds., op. cit. n. 17, p. 426Google Scholar.

24. Cf., the Report of the 62nd Conference of the ILA (Seoul, 1986) pp. 425, 474, 477, 481.

25. See, on the background and meaning of these articles of the UN Charter: Pellet, A. and Bauonoy, L., in Cot, J-P. and Pellet, A., eds., La Charte des Nations Unies. Commentaire article par article (1985) pp. 841–891Google Scholar.

26. Friedmann, W., The Changing Structure of International Law (1964) pp. 92–93Google Scholar.

27. Abi-Saab, G., ‘Progressive Development of the Principles and Norms of International Law Relating to a New International Economic Order’, UNITAR/UN Doc. A/39/504/Add. l, 23 10 1984, p. 72Google Scholar.

28. In rare cases there may be some doubt, e. g., when Zaire nationalized a British-owned company in Zaire together with its wholly-owned subsidiary in Rwanda, there could be some doubt whether the host State of the Rwandese company was Rwanda or Zaire (which seemed to exercise sovereign rights over the company and which was the country expected to pay compensation to the British parent company); and there may be doubt when frontiers are changed or new countries are formed, e. g., after 1945 it was not always clear whether German subsidiaries of American companies had West Germany or East Germany as their host State.

29. In the case of companies, such as operating companies belonging to the Royal Dutch/Shell Group, the Netherlands and the UK may be regarded as joint home States, having regard to the fact that the two parent companies of that Group are a Dutch and a British company, respectively; or the Netherlands might be regarded as the appropriate home State in view of the fact that the Dutch parent company has the majority interest in the Group as a whole; or it could be considered, in line with the Barcelona Traction judgment, that the proper home State was the State where the relevant holding company of the operating company in question was established (which might be, eg., the Bahamas). In the case of the EEC Code of Conduct on South Africa, reporting responsibility for Shell companies in South Africa rests with the UK rather than the Netherlands, as the immediate parent company of the South African subsidiaries is in the UK; and when Shell companies had committed breaches of mandatory UN sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in the 1960s, it was recognized that, for similar reasons, the international responsibility rested upon the UK.

30. E. g., the 1981 Treaty for promotion, protection and guarantee of investments among the (46) Member States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (in force since 1988); and the 1987 Treaty for the promotion and protection of investments among the ASEAN Member States (27 ILM (1988) p. 612).

31. E. g., the 1965 ICSID Convention (International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States); the 1985 MIGA Convention (Convention establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency); and some more general treaties such as the 1944 Articles of Agreement of the IMF (as amended).

32. E. g., the OECD code of liberalisation of capital movements; and the several (binding) decisions of the OECD Council on the guidelines for MNE's, on national treatment and on international investment incentives and disincentives; and the (legally non-binding) OECD Guidelines for multinational enterprises of 1976 (as amended). Among the non-mandatory instruments there are numerous UNGA resolutions, of which Res. 1803 of 1962 and Res. 3281 of 1974 (whereby CERDS was proclaimed) merit special mention. Other relevant soft law instruments are: the 1977 ILO tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning MNEs and Social Policy; the 1980 UNCTAD set of multilaterally agreed equitable principles and rules for the control of restrictive business practices; and the 1977 EEC code of conduct for companies with interests in South Africa.

33. See the awards in BP v. Libya (1973), Topco/Calasiatic v. Libya (1977) and Liamco v. Libya (1977), as summarized and analyzed by von Mehren, R. B. and Kourides, P. N. in 75 AJIL (1981) p. 476CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also the Aminoil v. Kuwait award (1982) as published in 21 ILM (1982) p. 976 and a number of more recent cases decided by the Iran/US Claims Tribunal, as discussed by Pellonpää, M. and Fitzmaurice, M. in 19 NYIL (1988) p. 53CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

On the subject in general and for the literature on it, see Higgins, R., ‘The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in International Law’, 176 Hague Recueil (1982) p. 13 et seqGoogle Scholar.

34. See the report which the OECD Committee on international investment and MNEs (CIME) submitted on the 1984 Review of the 1976 Declaration on international investment and MNEs. The report was endorsed by the Ministers on 17 May 1984.

35. The choice of this treaty is arbitrary, but it represents a treaty between two developing countries where it is unlikely to be claimed that the terms were not freely agreed upon.

36. Taken from 1987 UK/Dominica Treaty.

37. Para. 12 of the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning MNEs and Social Policy, as adopted in 1977.

38. Ibid., para. 23.

39. Ibid., para. 45.

40. Cf., the OECD-CIME (Committee for International Investment and MNEs) report referred to in n. 34 supra (paras. 26 and 27 of the 1984 Review of the 1976 Declaration and Decisions).

41. Included in the 1976 OECD Guidelines for MNEs as an understanding of the member countries in setting forth those Guidelines.

42. Basic data are included in Tropical Forests: A Call for Action, a report by an International Task Force convened by the World Resources Institute, The World Bank, and the United Nations Development Programme, 1985. This report led to the Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP, 1985), initiated by these three institutions and the Food and Agriculture Organization. See also The Vanishing Forest. The Human Consequences of Deforestation, a report for the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues, London, 1986Google Scholar, and Gradwohl, J. and Greenberg, R., Saving the Tropical Forests (1988)Google Scholar.

43. UN Environmental Programme (UNEP), Annual Report 1987 of the Executive Director (1988) p. 76Google Scholar.

44. Postel, S. and Heisa, L., ‘Reforesting the Earth’, in State of the World 1988. A Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society (1988) pp. 83–100 at p. 96Google Scholar.

45. See the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (the so-called Brundtland Commission), Our Common Future (1987) Chapter 6.

46. Principle 21 of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 1972.

47. Ibid., principle 22.

48. This Western Hemisphere Convention entered into force in 1942. In 1984 it had 18 States Parties. Honduras, Guyana and Surinam did not sign the Convention, while Bolivia, Cuba and Colombia have only signed but not ratified it. The text of the Convention has been published in Kiss, A. C., ed., Selected Multilateral Treaties in the Field of the Environment, UNEP Reference Series 3 (1983) p. 64Google Scholar.

49. Lyster, S., International Wildlife Law (1985) p. 111Google Scholar.

50. The African Convention entered into force in 1969 and had 28 States Parties in 1984. Text in Kiss, , op. cit. n. 48, p. 207Google Scholar.

51. Text in Kiss, , op. cit. n. 48, p. 496Google Scholar and in 17 ILM (1978) p. 1045. In 1980 the Amazonian Treaty entered into force upon ratification by all Contracting Parties.

52. Trebilcock, A. M., ‘Treaty for Amazonian Co-operation’, in: Berhardt, , op. cit. n. 2, Instalment 6 (1983) p. 359Google Scholar.

53. See Mahar, D. J., Government Policies and Deforestation in Brazil's Amazon Region, A World Bank Publication (1989)Google Scholar.

54. Debts for nature swaps involve the purchase of a developing country's debt at a discounted value in the secondary debt market, and debt cancellation in return for environment-related action on the part of the debtor nation.

55. The text of the Amazonian Declaration will probably be published in a 1989 issue of ILM.

56. Text in 15 Environmental Policy and Law (1985) p. 64–69.

57. Text in Kiss, , op. cit. n. 48, p. 276Google Scholar. The World Heritage Convention entered into force in 1975. As of December 1988, it had 104 States Parties.

58. Text in Kiss, , op. cit. n. 48, p. 246Google Scholar. The Wetlands Convention, commonly called the Ramsar Convention, entered into force in 1975. As of October 1988, it had 46 States Parties.

59. Text in Kiss, , op. cit. n. 48, p. 289Google Scholar. This Convention was concluded in 1973 and entered into force in 1975. As of October 1988, 95 States were Parties to it.

60. Cf., Lyster, , op. cit. n. 49, p. 277Google Scholar.

61. The Lomé III Convention entered into force in 1985 and will expire in 1990. The text has been published in a special issue of The Courier, No. 89 (01-02 1985)Google Scholar.

62. The text of the International Tropical Timber Agreement has been published in UN Doc. TD/TIMBER/11; see also UNCTAD Bulletin, no. 198 (1984)Google Scholar.

63. Resolution 1 (VI), 24 May 1989, International Tropical Timber Council.

64. For a review, see Allott, P., ‘State Responsibility and the Unmaking of International Law’, 29 Harvard ILJ (1988) pp. 1–26Google Scholar.

65. Cf., also Lang, W., ‘Environmental Protection – The Challenge for International Law’, 20 Journal of World Trade Law (1986) pp. 489–496Google Scholar.

66. See Sachariew, K., ‘State Responsibility for Multilateral Treaty Violations: Identifying the “Injured State” and its Legal Status’, 35 NILR (1988) pp. 273–291CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

67. See Hossain, K., ‘Natural Resources: Heritage of Nations and Mankind’, in Grahl-Madsen, A. and Toman, J., The Spirit of Uppsala (1984) pp. 302–313Google Scholar; Schrijver, N.J., ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources versus the Common Heritage of Mankind: Complementary or Contradictory Principles of International Economic Law?’, in Waart, De et al. , op. cit. n. 17 pp. 87–101Google Scholar.

68. Brundtland Report, supra n. 45, p. 162Google Scholar.

69. Cf., Lammers, J. G., Pollution of International Watercourses (1984), especially pp. 342–386, pp. 587–596, and pp. 659–661Google Scholar. This book's search for substantive rules and principles of law on obligations of States to prevent transfrontier water pollution which can cause substantial extraterritorial harm is also relevant for the search for existing or evolving rules and principles pertaining to national management of tropical rain forests.