Investigating Romanian radical right populism, I evidence the gendered nature of conceptual metaphors and provide insights on the specific masculinities that they underpin in such political discourses. With the 2004 presidential elections as a backdrop, the analysis focuses on how the radical right populist candidates articulated in their discourses the conceptual metaphor of the “strict father.” At first, the theoretical standpoints on conceptual metaphors are corroborated with the conceptualization of populist charismatic leadership. Subsequently, a gendered perspective is added to the populist conceptualizations. The leaders’ self-representation as messianic fathers of the national family is evidenced by investigating their discursive appeals to protect, discipline and punish the people. Furthermore, I elaborate how conceptual metaphors may be employed to consolidate a position of uncontested leadership and moral superiority of the radical right populist leaders.

Football (soccer) provides a useful prism for analysis of the long transition of the Serbian state and society since 1991. To a striking extent, the world of professional football and the attendant phenomena of financial corruption and football hooliganism have informed both the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and the current concerted attempt to create a “European Serbia.” During the 1990s, football in Serbia to a significant extent became synonymous with organized crime and the criminalization of the Serbian state. Since 2000, the persistent phenomena of crime, violent hooliganism and lethargic reforms have mirrored the difficult and halting transition of the post-Milošević state. Although recent events highlight the reluctance of the Serbian authorities to confront these problems, both government and sports officials are coming to see reform of Serbian football as a key element of the establishment of the rule of law.

Despite considerable scholarly work on ethnic mobilization, less attention has been paid to explicitly examining how differing notions of the state undergird our analysis and normative approaches. As the title of Ted Gurr's Peoples versus States reminds us, the state is central to these processes. Similarly, there seems to be widespread, yet little discussed, disagreement on the proper role of politics in ethno-politics. In other words, at what point do we shrug our shoulders and say, “minority X lost this political fight and that's the way democratic politics functions”? The three books here focus on vastly different topics (international minority rights norms, Native American struggles, and the Holy Roman Empire's decline), but in reading them together it is striking how their notions of the state and politics lead us to varying conclusions about the possibilities for minorities.

This article argues that the formation of a mass sense of Russian national identity was a recent, contingent event that first began to take shape under Stalin. Surveying the new literature on Russian nationalism, it contends that elite expressions of “Russianness” and bureaucratic proclamations of “official nationality” or russification should not be conflated with the advent of a truly mass sense of grassroots identity. Borrowing from an array of theorists, it argues that such a sense of identity only becomes possible after the establishment of necessary social institutions – universal schooling, a modern army, etc. Inasmuch as these institutions come into being only after the formation of the Soviet Union, this article focuses on how a mass sense of Russian national identity began to form under a rapid and unpredictable series of ideological shifts that occurred during the Stalinist 1930s and 1940s. This article's major contribution is its description of this development as not only contingent, but accidental. Drawing a clear line between russocentric propaganda and full-blown Russian nationalism, it argues that the ideological initiatives that precipitated mass identity formation in the USSR were populist rather than nationalist. In this sense, Stalinism has much more in common with Perónism than it does with truly national regimes.

After having published a book, an author must take into account that his text remains unprotected, and becomes an object of new readings which reflect different social and political conditions, and the interests of subsequent generations of readers. Consequently, an author's concepts and opinions are open to various reflections and can be used as arguments or tools of analysis, as inspirations, models, or targets of criticism. These processes occur independently of an author's expectations and original goals. In a broader sense, we can agree with antiquity: “Habent sua fata libelli.” My book on the “Social Preconditions of National Revival” has been no exception, and it is a great pleasure for me to realize that this book has survived so many decades to live its “second life,” and that its original meanings and concepts inspire new interpretations, even if they have sometimes been misunderstood or exploited as arguments in totally different conditions and settings. It is a pleasant surprise to observe that my methods, typologies and generalizations can be (successfully?) discussed and used, naturally in a modified version, as tools to analyze developments and conflicts in very distant countries and times. Alexander Maxwell has given an excellent and well-informed overview of this differentiated and sometimes controversial second life. All other contributions to this issue, analyzing concrete cases, could be understood as indications that my scientific efforts have made sense, and sometimes inspired researchers up to the present day.

This article is the fifth and final in a Nationalities Papers series providing an overview of the development of Romani political group representation and administration, from the arrival of Roma to Europe up to 1971, the landmark year of modern transnational Romani politics. The article concentrates on the period between the Second World War and 1970 and the emergence of the following phenomena which distinguish this period from those covered in the previous articles: some limited Romani participation in non-Romani mainstream political or administrative structures, an international Romani evangelical movement, reconciliation between Romani political representation and the Catholic Church, national institutions created by various governments to aid the administration of policies on Roma and rapid growth of non-governmental organizations addressing Romani issues.

This study draws on ethnographic research conducted in a small village, Baltinava in Latvia, 2.5 kilometres from the border with Russia. The research examines how ethnic Russian women create a specific Latvian Russian identity by contrasting themselves from ethnic Latvians and Russians who live in Russia and identifying with both groups at the same time. To narrate their lives and to make them meaningful, real and/or perceived “attributes” are combined to draw boundaries between “us” and “them.” Thus, the same thing such as language can be used not only both to distinguish themselves from Russians in Russia or Latvians but also to form coherent identities and to emphasize similarities. This study suggests that ethnicities cannot be reduced to a list of set ethnic groups that are very often used in official government statistics. Ethnic identities have to be viewed as fluid and situational. Moreover, this study shows the dialectic nature of ethnicity. On the one hand, external political, historical and social processes create and recreate ethnic categories and definitions. Yet, on the other hand, the women in this study are active agents creating meaningful and symbolic ethnic boundaries.

If Lenin were alive today and to find himself in Stalin's hands, without any doubt, he would have confessed being a German spy – and, maybe, with some more justification [than others who had done so in 1937-1938]. (Georgii Fedotov after the third show trial (as quoted in Liuks [Luks], Istoriia Rossii i Sovetskogo Soiuza 258)).

David Brandenberger argues that contemporary Russian identity was mainly a result of a “historical accident.” He maintains that this national identity was a product of the twentieth century rather than the nineteenth, which is more commonly cited, and that in terms of the state formulating a conception of what it meant to be Russian, the first decade of the Soviet period achieved little. However, by the late 1920s Soviet ideologists began to seek something more appealing than the mundane party slogans and eventually added non-proletarian, historical Russian heroes to the Soviet pantheon, particularly after the purges when the latter group was sorely depleted. This campaign was largely successful in inducing an understanding of national identity from a non-proletarian past as is evident today. He perceives this process as the formation of a Soviet populism, designed to mobilize society “on the mass level” and compares Stalin's USSR with Latin American dictatorships in this regard. Stalin, he argues, “was an authoritarian populist rather than a nationalist.” By 1953, Russians had a much better idea about their identity than in the period before 1937.