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The Pact is Dead: Long Live the Pact

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 March 2020

Waltraud Schelkle*
Affiliation:
European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science
*
E-mail addresses: w.schelkle@lse.ac.uk

Abstract

The ECOFIN Council decision of November 2003 that noted the existence of ‘excessive deficits’ in France and Germany but did not impose sanctions on these two governments was widely interpreted as sounding the death-knell for the Stability and Growth Pact. A ruling by the European Court of Justice on 13 July 2004 annulled this decision, paving the way for reform of fiscal policy coordination in the Euro Area. This article examines what caused the difficulties that have arisen, reviews and appraises a range of proposals for reform of EMU's fiscal policy rules and suggests a way forward.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © 2004 National Institute of Economic and Social Research

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Footnotes

We are grateful to the editors of the Review for constructive suggestions.

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