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Economic Policy Coordination in the European Union

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 March 2020

Iain Begg
Affiliation:
London School of Economics and Political Science
Dermot Hodson
Affiliation:
London School of Economics and Political Science
Imelda Maher
Affiliation:
London School of Economics and Political Science

Abstract

There are differing views about the need for economic policy coordination in the EU and about the adequacy of the system that has evolved under EMU. This article examines the case for such policy coordination, then describes and assesses the current arrangements for both ‘hard’ coordination — epitomised by the much-maligned Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) — and the ‘soft’ forms of coordination that have evolved in the EU to complement formal rules. Although the system achieves more than is sometimes recognised, it is shown to have weaknesses. Options for reforming the SGP and other facets of the system are discussed.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © 2003 National Institute of Economic and Social Research

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Footnotes

The authors are grateful to the ESRC for financial support under research project L213252034 and to the European Commission for funding the Govecor project. Helpful comments have been provided by the editors of the Review.

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