The Italian centre-right was ‘constructed’ by Silvio Berlusconi in the run-up to the 1994 general election, which marked the beginning of the Second Republic. It includes Forza Italia, the National Alliance, the Northern League and the Union of Christian Democrats (UDC), parties which are all very different in terms of their political identities, histories, geographies and social composition. The centre-right thus looks like a complex mosaic, whose pieces stay together only thanks to the role of the leader and his ‘personal party’, Forza Italia, and to the use of the media and political marketing to communicate with the electorate. These are the twin pillars of ‘the Berlusconi model’. This article contends that Berlusconi represents both a resource and a limit for the centre-right, as it is difficult for such a heterogeneous coalition to define a common identity and pursue coherent political projects and policies while relying so heavily on the role of the leader. This explains the cyclical alternation within the coalition of phases of integration and rapprochement with others of tension and open conflict. Since the coalition's election victory in 2001, it has found it difficult to meet the contrasting demands of its diverse electorate for neo-liberalism, devolution, major public works, infrastructure creation and tax cuts. This task has been made more problematic by the international instability and economic stagnation of recent years. This article puts forward the hypothesis that ‘the Berlusconi model’, which gave life to the centre-right, now appears to be worn out and will prove difficult to revive.

The three years 2001–03 opened in an atmosphere of optimism with the expectation of a new Italian miracle but ended amid widespread disillusion owing to persistent signs of economic decline. This article offers a reconstruction of events in this period, focusing on government economic policy and changes in the labour market. Analysis of these reveals the period to have been characterized by three significant features. In the first place, a growing loss of credibility and authority of government economic policy itself, resulting from the gap between expectations and outcomes. Second, the persistence of a model of development based on low product competitiveness and low-skilled labour. And last, the excessive attention paid to resolving the issues of the moment contrasted with a lack of interest in the future, and consequently in research, innovation, training and infrastructure.

This article provides a review and an assessment of the foreign policy of the second Berlusconi government. The first section summarizes the changes Italian foreign policy underwent at the end of the Cold War. The second focuses on the question of continuity and change regarding the two traditional pillars of Italian foreign policy, the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance, during the second Berlusconi government's time in office. The article concludes that if the current government has brought changes to Italian foreign policy, they concern its tone and style more than its substance, and that the claim that Italy has embarked on a new foreign policy course is a political exaggeration.

This article explores the communication strategy of Silvio Berlusconi through the analytical framework of the ‘permanent campaign’ model. Beginning with the distinction between ‘personal popularity’ and ‘political consensus’, the article looks at the different aspects of Berlusconi's political communication strategy since his election victory in May 2001 and assesses the rationale and effectiveness of his permanent campaign. The author concludes that, despite Berlusconi's strong commitment to the communication process, his leadership appears more similar to the rhetorical Presidency model than to the experiences of leaders who have shown that campaigning can also be used to govern. The article identifies two key limits: (1) the link between the drive for personal popularity and the building of support for the government's main policies appears weak; (2) all communication strategies are undermined by deep divisions within the ruling coalition.

Since its defeat in the 2001 general election, the Italian centre-left has been unable to come to any agreement on the question of its political leadership, either inside or outside parliament. For various reasons, neither of the defeated candidates—Francesco Rutelli of the Margherita and Piero Fassino, the new secretary of the Democrats of the Left—was able to take on this role. Nor could the centre-left agree on appointing Massimo D'Alema as the alliance's spokesperson in parliament. As a result, the choice regarding the alliance leadership was continually postponed with the excuse: ‘The centre-left has lots of prominent figures. When the time comes we will choose one of them’. For a time, there was popular support in favour of a leadership role for Sergio Cofferati, the former Secretary of the Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL). However, the likelihood of this scenario receded with his decision to run as candidate-mayor for Bologna. Subsequently, the return from Brussels of the only centre-left leader to have won a general election, Romano Prodi, seemed to resolve the leadership question. However, Prodi quickly became aware that, while the party oligarchs of the centre-left were prepared to make him leader, they were not willing to yield much power. Prodi therefore suggested the use of electoral primaries to decide the leadership issue. In this way, he hoped to build up sufficient consensus from the Olive Tree/centre-left electorate to allow him to become not only head of the government, but also the real leader of the alliance. To date, however, the problems surrounding the centre-left leadership and the undefined nature of the Olive Tree remain unresolved.