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EMANCIPATION IN THE INDUSTRIAL AGE: TECHNOLOGY, RATIONALITY, AND THE COLD WAR IN HABERMAS’S EARLY EPISTEMOLOGY AND SOCIAL THEORY*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 15 December 2014
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In his 1968 essay “Technology and Science as ‘Ideology’,” Jürgen Habermas deals more explicitly than in other works with phenomena related to modern technology and science.1 He is well known for his social theory, legal theory, and theories of subjectivity and intersubjectivity, and has been a major figure in the intellectual history of modern Europe due to the twin role he has played as both a voice and a representative of the political and philosophical movements of postwar and post-Holocaust West Germany. Exploring the role of technology in his thinking brings into focus technology's ambiguous status in critical social theory as well as the general relationship between intellectual history and the history of technology. The disturbingly open-ended question whether technology is modernity's blessing or its curse has mobilized critics and commentators at least since the Industrial Revolution and has divided them at political, epistemic, and moral levels. Habermas's project sits in the middle of such traditions, and his 1968 essay “updates” long-standing concerns about industrial modernity for the specific technological, philosophical, and political conditions of the early Cold War. Intersections between technology and his signature fields—intersections that he has both forged and contributed to—are found in political theories of technology and democracy (in the forms, for example, of technocracy and technological determinism), epistemologies of scientific knowledge and their relevance for theories of the reasonable subject and of knowledge communities, and theories of secularization and modern state-building.2
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Footnotes
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I am grateful to Uljana Feest, Judith Surkis, John Tresch, and the three anonymous reviewers for their generous and insightful comments.
References
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12 Habermas says in the Preface to Erkenntnis und Interesse, “Daß wir Reflexion verleugnen, ist der Positivismus” (Habermas's emphasis). Habermas, Jürgen, Erkenntnis und Interesse (Frankfurt am Main, 1968), 9Google Scholar. Habermas insisted, against Popper, that even in the exact sciences there was not only an “instrumental” rationality operating but also an interpretive and intersubjective one (of the type that he would later call “communicative”). Habermas, , “Analytische Wissenschaftstheorie und Dialektik: Ein Nachtrag zur Kontroverse zwischen Popper und Adorno,” in Horkheimer, Max, ed., Zeugnisse, Theodor W. Adorno zum sechzigsten Geburtstag (Frankfurt am Main, 1963), 473–501, esp. 493)Google Scholar. See also Frisby, David, “The Popper–Adorno Controversy: The Methodological Dispute in German Sociology,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 2/1 (1972), 105–19CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
13 Pinzani, Jürgen Habermas, 21 and 53.
14 Habermas, Erkenntnis und Interesse, 9. This is an often-quoted claim. See, for example, Dryzek, John, “Critical Theory as a Research Program,” in White, Stephen K., ed., The Cambridge Companion to Habermas (Cambridge, 1995), 97–119, at 100CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Pinzani, Jürgen Habermas, 67. Inspired by analytical philosophy and the controversy on positivism, Habermas later took back this primacy of epistemology in attempts to develop a theory of society. Habermas, Jürgen, “A Philosophico-Political Profile” (interview), New Left Review, 151/1 (1985), 75–105, esp. 77Google Scholar. Another disclaimer is needed here: Habermas's idea about modern science was outdated by at least two generations already at the time that he wrote his 1968 essay. His work on science and technology was not written or received in debates closely related to the largely Anglo-American tradition of science and technology studies, and his essay was never in sustained conversation with the lively 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s philosophy, sociology, and history of science. Overlaps can be found, but the traditions unfolded independently and used different terminologies to come to terms with the phenomena of modern science and technology. Alford, C. Fred, Science and the Revenge of Nature: Marcuse & Habermas (Gainesville, FL, 1985), 77Google Scholar; and Vogel, Steven, Against Nature: The Concept of Nature in Critical Theory (Albany, 1996), 7Google Scholar.
15 Pinzani, Jürgen Habermas, 67–8.
16 Habermas, Jürgen, “Die Dialektik der Rationalisierung: Vom Pauperismus in Produktion und Konsum,” Merkur, 8/8 (1954), 701–24Google Scholar.
17 Kießling, Die undeutschen Deutschen, 40–44.
18 Bohrer, Karl Heinz and Scheel, Kurt, eds., Die Botschaft des MERKUR: Eine Anthologie aus fünfzig Jahren der Zeitschrift (Stuttgart, 1997), 7Google Scholar.
19 Dews, Peter, ed., Autonomy and Solidarity: Interviews (London, 1986), 187Google Scholar. I owe this reference to Outhwaite, Habermas, 6.
20 Habermas, “Dialektik,” 702, Habermas's emphasis.
21 Ibid., 703.
22 Ibid., 711.
23 Habermas, Jürgen, “Marx in Perspektiven,” Merkur, 9/12 (1955), 1180–83, at 1183Google Scholar. I owe this reference to Pinzani, Jürgen Habermas, 36.
24 Habermas, “Dialektik,” 701.
25 Ibid., 702.
26 Ibid., 703.
27 Ibid., 704.
28 This progress, he claims, contains a self-limitation due to its inherent rationality, in its margins for regeneration. He calls this a “social” rationality. Ibid., 709.
29 In this context he also cites widely read literature of the late 1940s and early 1950s on mechanization, of which signature items were Anneliese Maier's Die Mechanisierung des Weltbildes im 17. Jahrhundert from 1938, Sigfried Giedion's Mechanization takes Command from 1948, and E. J. Dijksterhuis's The Mechanization of the World Picture from 1950, as well as mid-twentieth-century sociology of labor such as Georges Friedmann's Probleèmes humains du machinisme industriel from 1946 and Friedmann and Pierre Naville's Traité de sociologie du travail from 1964. Habermas, “Dialektik der Rationalisierung,” 704–9.
30 By “metaphysical” I do not refer to Heideggerian or Husserlian traditions of Lebensphilosophie or existentialism and instead mean accounts of, and claims about, technology's identity and causal efficacy. I certainly do not mean to interfere with Habermas's well-developed research agenda of “postmetaphysical thinking.” Habermas, Jürgen, Postmetaphysical Thinking (Cambridge, MA, 1992), esp. 50–51Google Scholar.
31 Steven Vogel, Against Nature, 106, makes a similar point.
32 This belief correlates with sentiments in North American countercultures in the same period. Langdon Winner describes in 1977 in a book tellingly subtitled “Technics-out-of-Control” how in the 1960s and early 1970s technology as a theme “became relevant” to political theory. Winner, Langdon, Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political Thought (Cambridge, 1977), xGoogle Scholar. Twelve years later Thomas Hughes discusses along similar lines authors who investigated during that period the “foundations of the technological society”—among them Jacques Ellul, Herbert Marcuse, Lewis Mumford, E. F. Schumacher, and Theodore Roszak. They had a lasting influence on an entire generation of protesting youth, who fought for civil rights and against the Vietnam War, and later began to consider modern technology as “the common cause” of the problems that they were protesting. Hughes, Thomas P., American Genesis: A Century of Invention and Technological Enthusiasm, 1870–1970 (Chicago, 2004), 443–4Google Scholar. An important historical and intellectual hinge between European and North American discussions was Herbert Marcuse, who introduced American students and intellectuals to the key ideas and commitments of the Frankfurt school. His One-Dimensional Man from 1964 “brought to an audience of Americans the insights of the Frankfurt School of German philosophers and sociologists” (Hughes, American Genesis, 445–6), and through his “sudden popularity” in the 1960s United States, Critical Theory had a “significant influence on the New Left in this country.” Jay, Martin, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923–1950 (Boston, 1973), 5Google Scholar.
33 Horkheimer, Max and Adorno, Theodor W., Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York, 1997), xi, xii, and 4Google Scholar, among many other passages. In the large pool of commentary on Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment, I have found particularly helpful Hohendahl, Peter Uwe, “From the Eclipse of Reason to Communicative Rationality and Beyond,” in Hohendahl, Peter Uwe and Fisher, Jaimey, eds., Critical Theory: Current State and Future Prospects (New York, 2001), 3–28Google Scholar; and Hoy and McCarthy, Critical Theory, 103–43.
34 Habermas, Jürgen, “Die Verschlingung von Mythos und Aufklärung,” in Habermas, , Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne: Zwölf Vorlesungen (Frankfurt am Main, 1996), 130–57, at 130 and 138Google Scholar.
35 Ibid., 141–4 and 153. Habermas also explains that the Critical Theory of the first generation explicitly claimed and developed a notion of reason for itself, which the authors started doubting in the 1930s, which then resulted in the Dialectic of Enlightenment. Jürgen Habermas, “Zur Tradition kritischer Theorie,” in Habermas, Die Neue Unübersichtlichkeit, 167–173 and 171–2.
36 Habermas, “Zur Tradition,” 172–3.
37 McCarthy formulates this tension in this way: “Habermas is in general agreement on the need for a critique of instrumental reason . . . But he feels that the earlier attempts of the Frankfurt school often verged on a romantic rejection of science and technology as such.” Hoy and McCarthy, Critical Theory, 21.
38 Habermas, “Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie,” 84.
39 Alford, Science and the Revenge of Nature, 5, even calls it “the most dramatic” encounter.
40 Marcuse, Herbert, “Industrialisierung und Kapitalismus im Werk Max Webers,” in Marcuse, , Kultur und Gesellschaft II (Frankfurt am Main, 1965), 107–29Google Scholar. Dominick LaCapra points out that Habermas's text thus starts out in an “oblique or indirect fashion as a ‘critique of a critique’.” LaCapra goes on to apply Derrida's notion of “supplementarity” to Habermas's critique-of-a-critique strategy. LaCapra, Dominick, “Habermas and the Grounding of Critical Theory,” in LaCapra, , Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, Contexts, Language (Ithaca, NY, 1983), 145–83, at 154Google Scholar.
41 Habermas, Technik und Wissenschaft als “Ideologie”, 169.
42 I am grateful to one of my reviewers who drew my attention to this. The question mark is easy to overlook: it is missing on the cover page of the July 1968 issue of Merkur, which contains the original essay's first part. One only notices it if one takes the trouble to go back to the original article, which few libraries own and, in its online version, is behind a paywall. Habermas says nothing, as far as I can tell, about the omitted question marks in the essay's later version in the edited volume.
43 The subheadings that disappear include the following: “Herbert Marcuse's critique of Max Weber,” “The idea of a new technology,” “Work and interaction,” “What distinguishes traditional and modern societies?”, “State-regulated capitalism,” “Science and universities as primary force of production,” “Class struggle and ideology today,” “Two notions of rationalization,” and “The new potential for protest: high school and college students.”
44 The collection includes, among others, the two essays with the foreshadowing titles “Work and Interaction” and “Knowledge and Human Interests.” Both his “quasi-transcendental” categories “work” and “interaction”, as well as his “cognitive interests” from the 1960s, became part of the foundation of the Theory of Communicative Action. Habermas, “Die Verschlingung von Mythos und Aufklärung,” 140; and Habermas, , Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, vol. 1 (Frankfurt am Main, 1981), 225–368Google Scholar.
45 Habermas, “Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie,” 48.
46 Ibid., 58–60.
47 Ibid., 59.
48 See references in footnote 32 above, as well as Edgerton, David, “Innovation, Technology, or History: What Is the Historiography of Technology About?”, Technology and Culture, 51/3 (2010), 680–97CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Wyatt, Sally, “Technological Determinism Is Dead: Long Live Technological Determinism,” in Hackett, Edward J.et al., eds., Handbook of Science and Technology Studies (Cambridge, MA, 2008), 165–80Google Scholar.
49 Habermas, “Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie,” 62–3. In the 1970s, Habermas reworked the knowledge-constitutive interests into a new paradigm embedded in a theory of communicative action. Vogel, Against Nature, 112.
50 Habermas, “Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie,” 63.
51 My account of Habermas's quasi-transcendental exercise relies in crucial parts on these four authors’ analyses: Alford, Science and the Revenge of Nature, 1–21; LaCapra, “Habermas and the Grounding of Critical Theory”; Vogel, Against Nature, 101–44; and Whitebook, Joel, “The Problem of Nature in Habermas,” Telos, 40/2 (1979), 41–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar. By “materialism” or “materialist,” I mean, in line with other authors, the material and causal reality of physical nature and technological artifacts, and I do not intend to confuse it with naive realism or epistemic objectivism. “Materialism” is certainly already charged with a range of meanings in Marxism and Critical Theory. McCarthy explains how Critical Theorists in the 1930s were revisiting flaws in Marx's and Lukács's theorizing and how that resulted in philosophical idealism being “replaced by positivist materialism as the chief enemy of critical thought.” McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas, 19–20.
52 Habermas himself admits that the term “quasi-transcendental” is “a product of an embarrassment which points to more problems than it solves.” Habermas, Jürgen, Theory and Practice (Boston, 1973), 14Google Scholar. Alford, Science and the Revenge of Nature, 6, quotes from the same passage.
53 “Practical” is here the literal translation of the German word praktisch. The use of “practical” is quite disparate in English and German. Shapiro writes in his “Translator's Preface” to Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, at vii, that, in current English usage, “practical” often means “down-to-earth” or “expedient,” and thus something very close to what Habermas means by “technical”—the opposite of praktisch. Shapiro explains that praktisch in Habermas's work always refers to “symbolic interaction within a normative order”: to ethics, politics, and questions about the nature of the good life (ibid., vii).
54 I rely here once again on Alford, Science and the Revenge of Nature, 80–81; LaCapra, “Habermas and the Grounding of Critical Theory,” 154–9; Whitebook, “The Problem of Nature in Habermas,” 45–6; and Vogel, Against Nature, 111–14.
55 Vogel, Against Nature, 106–11, and Whitebook, “The Problem of Nature in Habermas,” 48–9, explain how (quasi-)transcendental arguments can help bypass the idealism–materialism dichotomy. Alford provides details about the connections between Habermas's reflections on nature and twentieth-century history and philosophy of science. Alford, Science and the Revenge of Nature, 77.
56 Habermas, “Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie,” 58; Alford, Science and the Revenge of Nature, 99.
57 Whitebook, “The Problem of Nature in Habermas,” 66.
58 Ibid., 66.
59 Vogel, Against Nature, 106–24. Whitebook and LaCapra also point out problems arising from Habermas's quasi-transcendentalism.
60 Vogel, Against Nature, 112–13.
61 Ibid., 113.
62 Whitebook, “The Problem of Nature in Habermas,” 48–9; and Vogel, Against Nature, 113.
63 Vogel, Against Nature, 113.
64 Whitebook, “The Problem of Nature in Habermas,” 46.
65 Vogel, Against Nature, 113. This is similar to a paradox that Deborah Coen identifies in the history of the environmental sciences. She explains how Kant himself, whose analysis of the modern knowing subject took the form of a transcendental exercise, founded a modern science of the earth by eliminating the human subject from it. Coen, Deborah, The Earthquake Observers: Disaster Science from Lisbon to Richter (Chicago, 2013), 8Google Scholar.
66 Whitebook makes the incisive point about the regressive, pre-Kantian consequences of Habermas's assumption of a pre-human nature. Whitebook, “The Problem of Nature in Habermas,” 49.
67 Vogel, Against Nature, 112, calls him a model of intellectual integrity in this regard.
68 Ibid., 112.
69 Ibid., 112.
70 Vogel, Against Nature, 6, makes this point about Critical Theory in general. It might be worthwhile to revisit here the difference between Traditional and Critical Theory as defined by Max Horkheimer in his eponymous 1937 essay. The difference is the former's lack of awareness of its entanglement in the social conditions in which it is being practiced. Horkheimer targeted, of course, the positivistic philosophies of the empirical sciences of the time. Horkheimer, Max, “Traditionelle und kritische Theorie,” in Horkheimer, , Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 4 (Frankfurt am Main, 1988), 162–217Google Scholar.
71 Vogel, Against Nature, 10.
72 Habermas, “Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie,” 68.
73 Ibid., 66–7.
74 Ibid., 68, Habermas's emphasis. Lynn White uses a similar argument—the invention of invention—as part of his study of medieval technology and a way of periodizing the history of technology and distinguishing “modern” technology from its earlier relatives. White, Lynn, “The Medieval Roots of Modern Science and Technology,” in White, , Medieval Religion and Technology: Collected Essays (Berkeley, CA, 1978), 75–92, at 89Google Scholar.
75 Habermas, “Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie,” 68–9.
76 Ibid., 78.
77 Ibid., 81, Habermas's emphasis.
78 The reference to the language of cybernetics is obvious here. Habermas picked it up from, among other places, the terminology of systems theory, which was one of the most influential theoretical frameworks in 1960s German sociology. Luhmann, Niklas, Soziologische Aufklaärung: Aufsätze zur Theorie sozialer Systeme (Cologne, 1970), 78–9Google Scholar.
79 Habermas, “Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie,” 81. Habermas captures key aspects of the debate by citing works of Arnold Gehlen and Jacques Ellul.
80 The technocracy debate in West Germany was initiated by Schelsky, Helmut's Der Mensch in der wissenschaftlichen Zivilisation (Cologne, 1961)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Schelsky's forty-six-page essay reiterates elements of the history of industrialization and rationalization that Habermas, Marcuse, and Weber also engage, and Schelsky merges them with skeptical and conservative arguments about modern culture and industrial culture altogether, from, among others, his teachers Arnold Gehlen and Hans Freyer. See also Specter, Habermas, 96–7; and Laak, “From the Conservative Revolution to Technocratic Conservatism,” 148.
81 Lenk, Hans, “Vorwort des Herausgebers,” in Lenk, , ed., Technokratie als Ideologie: Sozialphilosophische Beiträge zu einem politischen Dilemma (Stuttgart, 1973), 7–8, at 7Google Scholar.
82 Koch, Claus and Senghaas, Dieter (eds.), Texte zur Technokratiediskussion (Frankfurt am Main, 1970), 5Google Scholar. Specter also emphasizes this history in his analysis of the relationship between Habermas's work and the student movements of the 1960s. Specter, Habermas, 110–11.
83 Habermas, Jürgen und Luhmann, Niklas, Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie: Was leistet d. Systemforschung? (Frankfurt am Main, 1971)Google Scholar.
84 Lenk, “Vorwort,” 7; Koch and Senghaas, Texte zur Technokratiediskussion, 5. Matthew Specter describes in a similar vein that students applied the blanket label “technocratic” to the politics they rejected. Specter, Habermas, 90–91. See also Laak, “From the Conservative Revolution to Technocratic Conservatism.”
85 Habermas, “Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie,” 81.
86 Alford, Science and the Revenge of Nature, 134–5.
87 The most recent volume, from 2013, of Habermas's series Kleine politische Schriften is indeed entitled Im Sog der Technokratie. Habermas, Jürgen, Im Sog der Technokratie: Kleine politische Schriften XII (Berlin 2013)Google Scholar.
88 Winner, Autonomous Technology, 6.