Buchanan arrived in India in 1794 and left in 1815. He was employed by the East India Company for these twenty years in a number of capacities but he is chiefly remembered today for two surveys he conducted: the first of Mysore in 1800 and the second of Bengal in 1807–14. These surveys have long been used by historians, anthropologists and Indian politicians to depict the nature of Indian society in the early years of British rule. Recently economic historians, Bagchi in particular, have used the ‘statistical’ tables compiled by Buchanan as a data base against which later statistical evidence about the Indian economy is measured. Bagchi believes that by doing this he can furnish firm proof of the extent to which British rule was detrimental to the people of India in the nineteenth century.

The spectre of a ‘Malthusian’ catastrophe engulfing the subcontinent commands less attention currently than in relatively recent times. This is largely attributable to the greater sense of confidence in the food-grain supply capacity of Indian agriculture in the wake of the Green Revolution. From the mid-1960s through to 1980, output has maintained a growth rate in excess of 2.5% p.a., with yield increments rather than area increments accounting for the major part. Since 1950, per capita net availability of foodgrains has increased by over 20%, while the real price of foodgrains has shown a steady downward trend since 1968. Current projections suggest that self-sufficiency in food production can be sustained through to the end of the century. Yet this remains partly contingent on climatic factors and a slackening trend of population growth. However, population growth rates currently exceed 2.2% p.a. and the relative stability of fertility rates means that a diminution is by no means assured. While supply shortfalls could be met through increased imports of food commodities, the possible emergence of India in the longer term as a food deficitary economy could have serious implications for the international grain market, given the current structure of supply for foodgrains and the growing dependence, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, on food imports.

The system of medicine known today variously as ‘international,’ ‘scientific,’ or ‘Western’ entered South Asia as early as the seventeenth century. For two centuries this system, known in India as allopathic medicine, coexisted with the medical traditions indigenous to South Asia. In 1835 the period of coexistence ended and the adherents of the allopathic tradition began to press claims that they, and only they, should be allowed to direct and staff the medical and health programs of the East India Company and, after 1858, the various Governments of South Asia. Allopathic medical men wished to decide the goal or goals of governmental medical efforts, who was to be allowed to participate in those efforts, and who was to be served by those programs. In short, allopathic medical men wanted control of the development of all facets of health policy in South Asia.

Historians, statesmen, administrators, nationalists and others have disagreed sharply about the impact of modernization in the era of Western domination. Did Western rule provide the tools for Indian progress but did economically medieval, ‘other-worldly’ Indians fail to maximize the benefits of modernization and even thwart advances? Conversely, did Western imperialism systematically impoverish India by making it a ‘satellite,’ freezing the subcontinent into a neo-feudal social pattern while sucking up its wealth? Finally, is a ‘new revisionist’ interpretation correct that India experienced real if undramatic economic growth during the Western era and that notions of exploitation or Indian suffering induced by development were myths? Interpretations expressing either the great success and benign innovations of Western rule, or its exploitiveness both appear flawed, according to Bombay's modernizing experience. Bombay underwent a great expansion of wealth and became the source of India's new factory textile production, the hub of a great newwork of trasport and trade, and the cosmopolitan abode of wealth Indian merchants, industrialist and professionals, whose affluence, modernity, industrializing activies and eventual nationalist orientation distinguished them from a supine or neo-feudal comprador class, cooperating with Western masters in exploiting ‘natives’ for a myrmidon's share of the profits. Alternatively, Bombay's prosperity did not flow down to the masses; its modernization was complex, dynamically helping to produce progress and wealth, but for some decades impoverishing and destroying many lives. In the half-century of rapid development preceding the first world war, the great majority of Bombay's populace, its ordinary working classes, experienced significant declines in living standards, worsening environmental conditions and escalating death-rates. Diminished real income and increased mortality among Bombay's ordinary inhabitants warn against extrapolating from rising indices of material production an optimistic conclusion about the general human condition in the city or in British India.

An underlying premise of much of the comment on developing countries' agricultural research organizations and capabilities, has been that they are weak, and have been unsuccessful in generating new technologies and meeting farmers' needs. Indeed, one of the very justifications for the setting up of the series of international research institutes, such as the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) was that national research programmes were seen to lack sufficient strength and organization to be able to respond to the urgent needs of food production that were identified in the 1960s. It was argued that a primary role of the International Centres would be to support and develop such national research programmes both through training and the provision of new plant varieties and technologies, and that the building up of local research capability in developing countries would come only after the International Research Centres had developed and transferred the new technologies.

While it is very well known that the small Indian state of Kerala has many extraordinary anthropological, demographic, ecological, economic, educational, historical, political, religious, etc. features (which are reflected in a vast and to some extent learned literature), so that it is quite unlike what Stokes denotes as ‘the great agricultural plains areas, which for centuries before the British had experienced large-scale political organization’, it is yet possible that certain of its peculiarities are still insufficiently appreciated. So I here note some of the ‘surprises’ (as well as the uncertainties) which I experienced as a result of spending nearly three months in 1981–82 doing fieldwork in the lowlands of rural Trivandrum District, in the extreme south of Kerala, while also consulting the excellent library of the Centre for Development Studies near Trivandrum city. Whether Kerala bears comparison with Java, as some have claimed, I cannot say; but, of course, it provided an extraordinary contrast to the villages in southeastern Karnataka where I had worked in 1977–78.

Feeling strong pressure from Western Powers Japan abandoned her seclusion policy in 1854 and inaugurated serious efforts to modernize her society and economy after the Meiji Restoration in 1868. She, in turn, forced Korea who had been keeping the seclusion policy on her own to open the door in 1876. The feudal Korean government (the Yi Dynasty, 1392–1910) was impelled to embark on social and economic reforms by opening the door. Yet, after nearly thirty years’ struggle to make reforms and to secure the independence of the country, Korea was converted into a protectorate of Japan in 1905 and was officially annexed to her in 1910. The Japanese government recognized that the creation of modern monetary and banking systems in Korea was the precondition for trade expansion between the two countries (for Japan, rice imports on the one hand and textile exports on the other) and thus started its colonial rule over Korea by establishing a central bank, development banks and financial cooperatives. This paper aims at setting forth an analysis of a more or less unexplored field in the study of the economic history of Korea, that is, the financial aspects of her economic growth under Japanese rule. Particularly, emphasis will be placed on quantitative analysis of major financial variables represented by money, interest rates and bank credit. Before proceeding to the main subject, it may well serve to review some of the financial problems in the late Yi Dynasty period.