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The Advance of Marketization in North Korea: Between political rigidity and economic flexibility

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 2019

TAT YAN KONG
TAT YAN KONG*
Affiliation:
Department of Politics & International Studies, SOAS, University of London Email: yk2@soas.ac.uk
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Abstract

North Korea is a unique regime that has not followed the ‘mono-transition’ path (economic reform under modified one-party rule) of other surviving communist regimes (China, Vietnam, Cuba) in the post-Cold War era. Debates over North Korea's unique features (reluctance in economic reform, absence of political modification, international troublemaking) have generated two contending interpretations. The mainstream interpretation attributes North Korea's uniqueness to its regime's highly rigid political system (‘monolithic leadership system’). For the alternative interpretation, structural pressures and political calculus have driven the monolithic regime towards economic reform (‘marketization from above’), making it more convergent with the ‘mono-transition’ regimes, at least in the economic aspect. In support of the latter interpretation, this article will delve further into three contentious issues that represent the most common doubts about the advance of marketization in North Korea. First, how can the regime reconcile marketization with the interests of its ‘core constituencies’? Second, since ‘crony socialism’ exists, how does it influence distribution and productive activity? Third, how does marketization advance in view of the persistence of monolithic rule? In so doing, it will show how the sources of economic reform (structural factors and political calculus) have enabled the marketization constraints to be overcome.

Type
Research Article
Information
Modern Asian Studies , Volume 54 , Issue 3 , May 2020 , pp. 830 - 867
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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Footnotes

Research and writing of this article were kindly supported by the Academy of Korean Studies Grant AKS-2015-R21. I benefited greatly from my discussions with many specialists, especially Seong-Chang Cheong, Nam-Hoon Cho, Ruediger Frank, Dong-Ho Jo, Hyung-Min Joo, Byeong-Yeon Kim, Dong-Yub Kim, Suk Lee, Chung-In Moon, Hyeong-Jung Park, and Hazel Smith. Hyo-Won Yoon and Eunmee Kim have always been welcoming and supportive during my frequent research trips to Korea. I would also like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and the editorial team of Modern Asian Studies for their support. This article is dedicated to the memory of my sister, Maisie (江詠頤) (1965–2018).

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85 The balance (per cent) between economy and military was as follows: 24.5/32.5 (2012); 34.0/29.7 (2013); 36.0/32.5 (2014); and 44.9/30.2 (2015). See Jeon, Y.-S., ‘The WPK's 70th anniversary and strengthening of the party's political control’ in 2016 DPRK Country Report, Korea Development Institute School of Public Management (ed.), KDI School, Seoul, 2015, pp. 18–54Google Scholar, at p. 40.

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93 I am grateful to Dr Seong-Chang Cheong for this observation (Discussion, 14 April 2016).

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99 Ibid., at p. 43.

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109 Park, ‘Informal political system’, pp. 143–4.

110 Suh, Economic Hardship, pp. 21–2.

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113 As described by Noland, ‘Why is North Korea growing?’.

114 NSO, Major Statistics Indicators of North Korea. ‘Textiles’ consists of ‘apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted’ (code 61) and ‘apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted’ (code 62).

115 Yang, North Korea's Planned Economy, pp. 54–5.

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123 Yang, ‘The evaluation of 2015’.

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129 Ibid., at p. 90.

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131 For example, see R. Frank, ‘Witnessing change in North Korea: a view from the ground’, Global Asia, 12(2) (2017), pp. 104–15.

132 IFES, ‘Expanding electronic payment system in North Korea’, NK Brief 06-4, 2017, http://ifes.kyungnam.ac.kr/eng/FRM/FRM_0101V.aspx?code=FRM170627_0001 [accessed 15 July 2017].

133 Lee, ‘Current trends and characteristics’, p. 133.

134 NSO, Major Statistics Indicators of North Korea.

135 Smith, North Korea, pp. 289–90.

136 Park, ‘Informal political system’, p. 151.

137 Saxonberg, Transitions, pp. 288–9.

138 Recent research has found that popular support for the Chinese regime extends beyond instrumental economic commitment. For example, see Dickson, B. J., The Dictator's Dilemma: The Chinese Communist Party's Strategy for Survival, Oxford University Press, New York, 2016Google Scholar.

139 This is the view of former Minister of Unification Lee Jong-Seok. See B.-Y. Hwang and H.-K. An, ‘Kim Jong-Un's objective is Chinese-style rapid growth … his father's testament: former Minister of Unification looks at Kim Jong-Un's dream’, Ohmynews, 5 April 2018, http://m.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/Mobile/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0002421483&CMPT_CD=MTO17 [accessed 5 April 2018].

140 KINU North Korea Studies Division, ‘Analysis of North Korea's 2016 New Year's address and domestic and foreign policy outlook’, KINU Online Series, CO16-01, 2016, pp. 5–7, https://www.facebook.com/KINU1991eng/?hc_ref=ARSrDnkqBqXaIiD7a-kVCKdZOMLxs2sJaIzGYxzOULh5r761XxLRD9KF0va23jL367s&fref=nf [accessed 6 March 2016].

141 E.-C. Lim, ‘The goal and the current status of building a “civilized country with socialism” at the 70th anniversary of the foundation of the party’ in KDI School, 2016 DPRK Country Report, pp. 145–75.

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