A war crimes trial embodies a combination of representational and presentational drama. The contemporary war crimes trial owes equal inspiration to the ‘realism’ of Henrik Ibsen and the ‘theatrics’ of Bertolt Brecht. The question for scholars is whether the trial is but a stylized presentation of the ‘real’ events, or a realistic medium through which to eavesdrop on history. This essay explores this question of war crimes and dramatization in the context of Director of Public Prosecutions v. Polyukhovich, the one war crimes case ever taken to trial under Australia's War Crimes Amendment Act of 1988.

This article engages with the current internationalist debate about the ‘linkage’ or the proper relationship of trade and human rights law. The debate, as played out in activist commentary, scholarly journals and the reports of international institutions, is largely concerned with the substantive obligations or normative commitments involved in the two fields. This article seeks to address instead the forms of law (the patterns of relations and subject positions) that transmit, frame or accompany these obligations and commitments. It suggests that focusing on this question of the forms of law is helpful, perhaps even necessary, in developing an understanding of the political effects of appealing to democratic participation as a counter to the excesses of economic globalization. The particular focus of the article is on WTO agreements that pursue the goal of regulatory harmonization as a means of achieving greater market access and economic integration. It explores the relationship between the form of law mandated by these harmonization agreements (the form of sacrifice), and the form of law envisaged in an appeal to democratic political participation (the form of abandonment).

Following the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Avena case, US courts have had a mixed record in applying the decision domestically. In this article, I examine the treatment by US courts of claims by criminal defendants alleging Vienna Convention violations, subsequent to the Avena judgment. First, I discuss the two limited decisions so far taken by the US Supreme Court regarding the Vienna Convention, and briefly explain several of the judicially-created rules that have prevented most US courts from reaching the merits of Vienna Convention claims. Next, I analyse the ICJ judgment in the LaGrand case, and provide an overview of the reception of that case by the US courts. After a summary of the Avena decision, I turn to the latest cases in which Vienna Convention claims based on Avena have been raised in US courts, focusing on the two most important decisions, and examining their contradictory rulings. As the US Supreme Court has now decided to hear an appeal in one of these cases, I conclude by arguing that the Supreme Court should take the opportunity to elucidate the role of the International Court of Justice in US law when the United States has consented to binding treaty interpretation by that court.

The ICJ in its judgments on the preliminary objections in the Legality of Use of Force cases held that it had no jurisdiction to hear the claims. Despite the unanimous concurrence in that result, it is clear that there were deep divisions within the Court as to the ground on which that decision should have been reached; only a bare majority subscribed to the reasoning that the Court was required to rule on the question of its jurisdiction ratione personae in relation to Serbia and Montenegro's uncertain status within the United Nations prior to 2000. The minority judges were highly critical of the choice of that basis of decision, in particular given its apparent implications for other cases pending before the Court.

This article focuses on the development of the crime of incitement to genocide and the prohibition of hate propaganda. It first examines the conflict which exists between these and the right to freedom of speech and concludes that a limitation of this right through prohibition of hate propaganda and criminalization of incitement to genocide is justifiable. The article then analyses how the crime of incitement to genocide and the prohibition of hate propaganda first developed historically, focusing on judgments by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the Genocide Convention, on the one hand, and on international conventions and case law by the Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights, on the other. Next, recent ICTR decisions are examined, in which the ICTR has considerably clarified and extended the concept of incitement to genocide. The tribunal has brought it closer to encompassing vicious hate propaganda by acknowledging that in order to incite individuals to commit genocide, incitement in the sense of instigation is insufficient; it requires the prior creation of a certain climate in which the commission of such crimes is possible. Hate propaganda leads to the creation of such a climate. It is argued that, for several reasons, virulent hate propaganda must be accorded the status of an international crime. Genocide could be prevented more effectively if such speech were criminalized. Several efforts to outlaw hate propaganda internationally in the past are examined. The article concludes that it can be regarded as a crime punishable under the Genocide Convention if a purposive interpretative approach is used, and that hate propagandists should be prosecuted for direct and public incitement to genocide if their hate speech is engaged in with the specific intent to commit genocide, and creates a substantial danger of genocide.

The recent decision of the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone in Prosecutor v. Samuel Hinga Norman not only addresses the status of child recruitment as a war crime, but also provides an insight into how international criminal tribunals determine what conduct is criminal in international law. However, the authority of the decision is weakened by the unconvincing evidence relied upon by the Appeal Chamber in coming to its conclusions and by a strong dissent from Justice Robertson. The decision's faults, however, merely reflect problems in the process whereby violations of international humanitarian law are criminalized.

On 31 May 2004, the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone ruled in a sweeping but brief decision that the Court had jurisdiction over Charles Ghankay Taylor, President of Liberia at the time of his indictment. The judges reached this conclusion finding that the accused could not invoke immunities ratione personae before this institution, an international criminal court. As this article demonstrates, the Chamber's argumentation lacks specificity and displays confusion over certain issues related to UN law, the law of international institutions and international immunities. The factual outcome is a welcome one, facilitating the prosecution of international crimes. Yet, the Appeals Chamber's approach is regrettable, especially if one considers that the same result could have been reached through less controversial avenues, without endangering the credibility of the Court and thereby the idea of international criminal justice through internationalized criminal courts.

Books and Articles in the Field of the Prevention and Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes (Winter 2004–05) Compiled by Ingrid Kost exclusively from materials available in the Peace Palace Library, The Hague