The late Professor Birks made an immense contribution to the study and development of the common law in devising his taxonomy, derived from the Roman classification of Justinian's Institutes. The utility of the taxonomy has always been the subject of controversy and its value has been increasingly questioned since his untimely death. Some of the criticisms are undoubtedly valid but it is seriously arguable that the pendulum has swung too far in the other direction. This paper seeks to highlight the common abuses of the taxonomy and demonstrate that, even taking account of its limitations, the taxonomy continues to be a useful device for our study and development of the common law.

Legislative restrictions on the sale of organs, gametes and surrogacy services are often seen as having no basis other than mere prejudice or taboo. This paper argues instead that they can be read as instances of a broader decommodification of healthcare provision established in Britain with the creation of the NHS in 1948. Restrictions on the marketisation of medicine were justified by Aneurin Bevan, the founder of the NHS, and by Richard Titmuss, one of its chief academic defenders, in distinctly utopian terms. On this vision, the NHS would function as a utopian enclave prefiguring an idealised non-capitalist future. This commonsense of post-war medicine was fatally destabilised by fiscal crisis and social critique in the 1970s. Influential commentators like Ian Kennedy developed an anti-utopian account of the real NHS and proposed legalistic and market-based reform. These reforms sought to dissolve the enclave, assimilating medical work and the NHS as a whole to broader systems of accounting and accountability. Insofar as they have been realised, they achieve a recommodification of medicine in Britain. The paper concludes by examining recent studies of the ‘new NHS’, which see in the latter-day idealisation of market processes a novel form of self-denying utopianism.

Should the doctrine of transferred malice operate in the law of tort? Although there has been little written on this topic in England and Wales, it appears generally to have been accepted by academic commentators that the answer to this question is in the affirmative. Consequently, when the High Court in Bici v Ministry of Defence applied the doctrine to the tort of battery, most regarded this as unremarkable. This paper, however, argues that this position is mistaken: that the doctrine of transferred malice has, and can have, no place in the law of tort. The paper also examines the nature of intention operative in the law of trespass and its relationship with recklessness.

This paper explores the relationship between religion and sentencing. It considers what problems may arise when a judge fails to take proper account of a defendant's religious beliefs at the sentencing stage, or takes improper account. It highlights the need for more guidance to be given to judges in order to ensure greater consistency and fairness in sentencing outcomes.

In this paper, we argue that clients who purchase commercial sex from victims of forced prostitution should be strictly liable in torts towards the victims. Such an approach is both normatively defensible and doctrinally feasible. Fairness and equality demand that clients would compensate victims, even if one refuses to acknowledge that purchasing sex from a prostitute who might be a victim is a faulty behaviour. Clients profit from the activity of purchasing commercial sex, so fairness demands they will bear the costs they impose on victims who are unable to refuse the contact. Strict liability will bring about desirable distributive results along the lines of sex, class and race. Imposing strict liability will ensure consistency of the English law of trespass and it is supported by several instrumental considerations.

Such strict liability could be grounded in battery, despite the appearance of apparent consent by the victim to sell sexual services to the client. This is so for two main reasons. First, the extreme coercion operated on the victim renders her consent void so that an innocent third party cannot rely on the appearance of consent. Secondly, the client should be considered as having constructive notice with respect to the trafficker's coercion. Our argument is supported by – but does not hinge upon accepting – the insight that the client's behaviour is ultimately faulty.

A fundamental aspect of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) is the statutory endorsement of a functional approach to capacity. In principle, this requires a separate assessment of capacity in respect of each decision to be made. Most capacity assessments take place at a non-judicial level, and, outside of day-to-day decisions, the most common assessors are likely to be healthcare professionals. This paper investigates the practical operation of the capacity assessment process at both judicial and non-judicial levels. It asks whether the process can deliver on the MCA's goal of preserving maximum decision-making freedom, while, at the same time, providing an appropriate degree of protection. It argues that assessors who are not legally trained encounter significant difficulties in carrying out the essentially legal task of assessing capacity. It also shows that assessors' values and biases, both professional and personal, are likely to impact on the conclusions reached. Having identified these difficulties, the paper considers their implications for the MCA's approach to capacity. It evaluates the attempts in the MCA itself to address assessors' limitations and argues that these will not have a substantial impact on the way in which capacity assessors operate. It considers other ways in which the quality of assessment could be improved and puts forward specific suggestions as to how greater assessor accountability can be delivered and increased rigour introduced to the capacity assessment process.