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German Lawyers and the State in the Weimar Republic

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 October 2011

Extract

Over the course of the late winter and spring of 1933, the German Bar Association (DAV), along with most other institutions in Germany, submitted to “coordination” by the new National Socialist regime. Coordination in reality meant a takeover of the private legal profession by younger lawyers who were National Socialist activists, directed from Berlin. The traditional leadership of the German bar permitted itself to be replaced by newcomers, formerly far removed from the centers of power in professional institutions. Regional lawyers' chambers, despite minor delays and efforts to express solidarity with colleagues in leadership now defined as falling outside of the “racial community,” also succumbed. Within five months, a profession that nineteenth-century reformers had condidered a bulwark of civil soviety, and which had viewed itself as a rock of independence from both state and public, had bowed to the demands of a party whose leader viewed lawyers with contempt and valued race over right.

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Copyright © the American Society for Legal History, Inc. 1995

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References

1. The best brief account of the coordination of the DAV is Ostler, Fritz, Die deutschen Rechtsanwälte, 1871–1971, 2d ed. (Essen, 1982), 229–35.Google Scholar See also the accounts in Krach, Tillmann, Jüdische Rechtsanwälte in Preuβen. Bedeutung und Zerstörung der freien Advokatur (Munich, 1991), 223–36, esp. 223–32Google Scholar, and Göppinger, Horst, Juristen jüdischer Abstammung im “Dritten Reich.” Entrechtung und Verfolgung, 2d ed. (Munich, 1990), 118–21.Google Scholar Although Hitler had become chancellor on January 30, 1933, the executive board of the DAV (Deutscher Anwaltverein) still managed on March 26 to refuse to merge the bar association with the National Socialist lawyers' organization (Bund nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Juristen, BNSDJ), because Jewish members of the DAV could not join. But the executive board was replaced on May 18, and the DAV corporately joined the National Socialist lawyers' group; the DAV formally dissolved itself on December 27.

2. The executive board of the lawyers' chamber (Anwaltskammer) in Celle, in the Prussian province of Hannover, refused on April 3 to dissolve itself as demanded by the Ministry of Justice in Berlin and rejected the resignation that its only Jewish member had tendered. The executive board was replaced by one dominated by National Socialists at a meeting of the membership of the lawyers' chamber which, contrary to the bylaws, was public and was dominated by SA thugs who stood in the back of the room. Niedersächsisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Hannover (N.H.St.A.), Hann. 173, Acc. 30/87, Nr. 30, “Geschäftsberichte,” 91–93. See also Mundt, Hermann, 100 Jahre Rechtsan-waltskammer für den Oberlandesgerichtsbezirk Celle (Hannover, 1979), 4348.Google Scholar For accounts of coordination at other lawyers' chambers, see Krach, Jüdische Rechtsanwälte, 215–23, esp. the list at 221.

3. A compendium of Hitler's anti-lawyer tirades may be found in Willig, Kenneth C. H., “The Theory and Administration of Justice in the Third Reich” (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1975), 350–55.Google Scholar See also examples of Hitler's anti-Semitic equation of lawyers with Jews in Krach, Jüdische Rechtsanwälte, 121–25.

4. Müller, Ingo, Hitler's Justice: The Courts of the Third Reich, trans. Schneider, Deborah Lucas (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), ch. 8Google Scholar, “Purges at the Bar,” 59–67. This book is a translation of Furchtbare Juristen. Die unbewältigte Vergangenheit unserer Justiz (Munich, 1987), and the translated title fails to convey the passion and breadth of the original; a better translation would be Fearsome Lawyers: The Unmastered Past of Our System of Justice. For evidence of the prominence of liberal lawyers of Jewish confession in the leadership of the bar, see Krach, Jüdische Rechtsanwälte, 77–79.

5. Focus on the political conservatism of German lawyers, especially the judiciary, during Weimar dates to contemporary observations, most forcefully pronounced by Hugo Sinzheimer and Ernst Fraenkel in the pages of the journal of the Republikanischer Richterbund, Die Justiz. See especially Fraenkel, Ernst, Zur Soziologie der Klassenjustiz (Berlin, 1927Google Scholar; repr. Darmstadt, 1968). By the mid-1960s, and especially after 1968, conservative rulings by judges under the Federal Republic inspired critics to explore longer continuities of conservatism among German judges; in addition to Müller, see Hannover, Heinrich and Hannover-Druck, Elisabeth, Politische Justiz 1918–1933 (Frankfurt a.M., 1966)Google Scholar; Kusserow, Raimund, Richter in Deutschland. Der Iängst füllige Report Uber die Halbgötter in Schwarz (Hamburg, 1982)Google Scholar; Senfft, Heinrich, Richter und andere Bürger. 150 Jahre politische Justiz und neudeutsche Herrschaftspublizistik (Nürdlingen, 1988)Google Scholar; and Engelmann, Bernt, Die unsichtbare Tradition, 2 vols. (Cologne, 19881989)Google Scholar, vol. 1: Richter zwischen Recht und Macht 1779–1918; vol. 2: Rechtsverfall, Justizterror und das schwere Erbe. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Strafjustiz von 1919 bis heute. Other new scholarship takes a more detached approach; see Angermund, especially Ralph, Deutsche Richterschaft 1919–1945. Krisenerfahrung, Illusion, politische Rechtspreckung (Frankfurt a.M., 1990)Google Scholar; see also the essays in Recht und Justiz im “Dritten Reich” ed. Ralf Dreier and Wolfgang Sellert (Frankfurt a.M., 1989).

The definitive work on radical nationalism and the illiberal milieu of university life, especially in the legal faculties, remains Jarausch, Konrad H., Students, Society and Politics in Imperial Germany: The Rise of Academic Illiberalism (Princeton, 1982).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6. Jarausch, Konrad H., The Unfree Professions: German Lawyers, Teachers, and Engineers, 1900–1950 (Oxford, 1990)Google Scholar and McClelland, Charles E., The German Experience of Professionalization: Modern Learned Professions and their Organizations from the Early Nineteenth Century to the Hitler Era (Cambridge, 1991).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7. In addition to his book, see the thoughtful essay by Jarausch, Konrad H., “The Decline of Liberal Professionalism: Reflections on the Social Erosion of German Liberalism, 1867–1933” in In Search of a Liberal Germany: Studies in the History of German Liberalism from 1789 to the Present, ed. Jarausch and Jones, Larry Eugene (New York, 1990), 261–86.Google Scholar

8. The arguments contained in this article, and the close connection of German lawyers to the middle-class project of German liberalism, are developed more fully in Ledford, Kenneth F., From General Estate to Special Interest: German Lawyers, 1878–1933 (forthcoming Cambridge, 1996).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9. From the very beginning of the functionalist analysis of the professionals, the background and evidence upon which the theorists drew was Anglo-American. See, for example, Carr-Saunders, A. M. and Wilson, P. A., The Professions (Oxford, 1933)Google Scholar, and Parsons, Talcott, “The Professions and Social Structure,” in Essays in Sociological Theory, rev. ed. (New York, 1954), 3449.Google Scholar For a criticism of this “parochialism,” see Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Lawyers and their Society: A Comparative Study of the Legal Profession in Germany and the United States (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), 1415.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

10. For a summary of the sociological literature on professionalization, see Abel, Richard L., American Lawyers (Oxford, 1989), 1439.Google Scholar

11. Larson, Magali Sarfatti, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (Berkeley, Cal., 1977), xvii–xviiiGoogle Scholar, excluded German lawyers from her analysis because: “[T]he Prussian legal profession was reformed by direct and repeated state intervention and remains to this day closely supervised and regulated by the state; … The model of professions should be closer in these cases to that of the civil service than it is to professions in England or, especially, in the United States.”

12. Especially important to this process are the programmatic writings of Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, such as “Professionalisierung. Theoretische Probleme fur die verglei-chende Geschichtsforschung,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 6 (1980): 311–25Google Scholar, 317, and “Comparing Legal Professions Cross-nationally: From a Professions-centered to a State-centered Approach,” American Bar Foundation Research Journal 12 (1987): 415–46. See also the essays in Professions and the French State, 1700–1900, ed. Geison, Gerald L. (Philadelphia, 1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, particularly Geison's introductory comments on the shortcomings of the sociological view of the professions at 1–4.

13. Rueschemeyer, “Professionalisierung,” 317; Conze, Werner and Kocka, Jürgen, “Einleitung,” in Bildungsbürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert. Teil I: Bildungssystem und Professionalisierung im internationalen Vergleich (Stuttgart, 1985), 926Google Scholar, 20; and Charles E. McClelland, “Zur Professionalisierung der akademischen Berufe im Deutschland,” in ibid., 233–47, 241–42.

14. Recent work on the German professions that has emerged from the Bürgertum project at the University of Bielefeld has refined significantly the approach to central European professions. See especially Hannes Siegrist, “Gebremste Professionalisierung—Das Beispiel der Schweizer Rechtsanwaltschaft im Vergleich zu Frankreich und Deutschland im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert,” in Bildungsbürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert, 301–331, 312, 329 (in English, “Professionalization with the Brakes On: The Legal Profession in Switzerland, France and Germany in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries,” Comparative Social Research 9 [1986]: 267–98); idem, “Public Office or Free Profession? German Attorneys in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries,” in German Professions, 1800–1950, ed. Cocks, Geoffrey and Jarausch, Konrad H. (Oxford, 1990), 4665.Google Scholar See also the essays in Bürgerliche Berufe. Zur Sozial-geschichte derfreien und akademischen Berufe im internationalen Vergleich, ed. Siegrist, Hannes (Göttingen, 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, especially idem, “Bürgerliche Berufe. Die Professionen und das BUrgertum,” 11–48.

Both McClelland, German Experience of Professionalization, 33, 109, 127, and Jane Caplan, “Profession as Vocation: The German Civil Service,” in German Professions, 1800–1950, 163–82, make the point that the state official was the model that central European “free” professions sought to emulate.

15. Gneist, RudolfFreie Advocatur. Die erste Forderung alter Justizreform in Preuβen (Berlin, 1867), 49.Google Scholar

16. O'Boyle, Lenore, “The Democratic Left in Germany, 1848,” Journal of Modern History 33 (1961): 374–83, 379.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

17. Gneist, Freie Advocatur, 70. Mittermaier, Carl Josef Anton, “Die künftige Stellung des Advokatenstandes,” Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 15 (1832): 138–50Google Scholar, 138–39, argued: “All attempts to effect a fundamental improvement … must fail if they are not based above all upon a better position for the legal profession …. It is the profession [Stand] of lawyers in private practice who appear everywhere as advisor to those in need of aid, as representative of the afflicted, as control of judges, as eternally watchful protector of all oppressed, as translator of judgments once handed down, as explicators of the law.”

18. Weiβler, Adolf, Geschichte der Rechtsanwaltschaft (Leipzig, 1905; repr. Frankfurt a.M., 1967), 458Google Scholar, reflects the persistence of this belief: “Since the bourgeoisie began to raise a claim to participation in the government, we have seen the practicing bar plunge spiritedly into the political struggle. … Because this phenomenon is observed in all countries, it must be connected with the profession.”

The conviction that French lawyers as a group supported the Revolution has had a long history. See, for example, Burke, Edmund, Reflections on the Revolution in France (Garden City, N.Y., 1973), 54Google Scholar; Tocqueville, Alexis de, Democracy in America, 2 vols. (New York, 1945), 1:284–85Google Scholar; Schnabel, Franz, Deutsche Geschichte im Neunzehnten Jahrhundert, 4 vols. (Freiberg, 1933; repr. Munich, 1987), 1:202–3Google Scholar; Cobban, Alfred, The Social Interpretation of the French Revolution (Cambridge, 1964), 5455, 58–62Google Scholar, 172. More recent work has begun to question the solidity of support for the revolution by lawyers, despite the obvious fact that many leading revolutionaries were lawyers. See Berlanstein, Lenard R., The Barristers of Toulouse (Baltimore, 1975), 148–82Google Scholar; Fitzsimmons, Michael P., The Parisian Order of Barristers (Cambridge, Mass., 1987), 196–98Google Scholar, in which he concludes that only the elite of the Parisian bar, those elected to the Estates General/National Assembly, supported the radical changes of the abolition of corporations, while the rank-and-file of the bar eschewed politics and preferred to live and practice within the old corporate idiom; and Bell, David A., Lawyers and Citizens: The Making of a Political Elite in Old Regime France (Oxford, 1994), 15Google Scholar, who points out flaws in monolithic views of the profession.

19. At the German National Assembly in Frankfurt in 1848–49, 491 of the 812 delegates and substitutes who sat during its life, fully 60.5 percent, had studied law at university. Siemann, Wolfram, Die Frankfurter Nationalversammlung 1848/49 zwischen demokratischem Liberalismus und konservativer Reform. Die Bedeutung der Juristen-dominanz in den Verfassungsverhandlungen des Paulskirchenparlaments (Bern and Frankfurt, 1976), 3334.Google Scholar Four hundred forty-five, almost fifty-five percent, were Volljuristen, who had completed legal studies and pursued some kind of legal career. See also Eyck, Frank, The Frankfurt Parliament 1848–1849 (London and New York, 1968), 57102CrossRefGoogle Scholar, especially Table 1 at 95.

Among the liberal parties in the Reichstag, the preponderance of lawyers was striking. Seventeen of the 120 National Liberal deputies in the first Reichstag (1871) were lawyers in private practice; 19 of 152 in the second (1874); 12 of 127 in the third (1877) and 10 of 98 in the fourth (1878). The numbers fell in the 1880s but rose again to 9 out of 44 in 1912. Similarly, 12 out of 42 Progressive party deputies in the Reichstag in 1912 were private practitioners. Kremer, Willy, Die soziale Aufbau der Parteien des Deutschen Reichstages von 1871–1918 (Dr. jur. diss., Cologne, 1934), 1314, 46–47.Google Scholar See also the summary tables drawn from Kremer in Langewiesche, Dieter, Liberalismus in Deutschland (Frankfurt, 1988), Table 7, 312–13Google Scholar, and in Sheehan, James J., German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago, 1978), 239–41.Google Scholar

20. For the development of the private practice of law in Germany, see the early history by Weiβbler, Geschichte der Rechtsanwaltschaft; see also Rueschemeyer, Lawyers and their Society, and Ostler, Die deutsche Rechtsanwdlte. The German term for “state-official-like” is beamtenähnlich.

21. For the background to the enactment of the reform legislation, see Ledford, Kenneth E., “Lawyers, Liberalism, and Procedure: The German Imperial Justice Laws of 1877–79,” Central European History 26 (1993): 165–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also the collections of materials in Schubert, Werner, Die deutsche Gerichtsverfassung (1869–1977). Entstehung und Quellen, Sonderheft 16 zu Ius Commune (Frankfurt a.M., 1981)Google Scholar, and idem, Entstehung und Quellen der Rechtsanwaltsordnung von 1878, Sonderheft 22 zu Ius Commune (Frankfurt a.M., 1985).

22. The Imperial Justice Laws include the constitution of the courts (Gerichtsver-fassungsgesetz) of January 27, 1877 (Reichsgesetzblatt 1877:41 ff.); the code of civil procedure (Zivilprozeβordnung) of January 30, 1877 (Reichsgesetzblatt 1877:83 ff.); the code of criminal procedure (Strafprozeβordnung) of February 1, 1877 (Reichsgesetzblatt 1877:253 ff.); and the lawyers' statute (Rechtsanwaltsordnung, [RAO]) of July 1, 1878 (Reichsgesetzblatt 1878:177 ff.).

23. On the question of freie Advokatur, see Huffmann, Helga, Kampf um freie Advokatur (Essen, 1967)Google Scholar and Müller, Lothar, Die Freiheit der Advokatur. Ihre geschichtliche Entwicklung in Deutschland während der Neuzeit und ihre rechtliche Bedeutung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Dr. jur. diss., Würzburg, 1972).Google Scholar The period of unpaid practical legal training is known as the Referendariat, and trainees in that stage are Referendare.

24. The DAV was in many ways the archetypal professional organization. From 1871 to 1933 it published, at first bi-monthly and then weekly, a professional newspaper aimed at lawyers in private practice and other legal scholars called Juristische Wochenschrift. Beginning in 1914 and running through 1933, it published another newspaper aimed only at its own membership and discussing matters of internal governance of the legal profession and other issues of concern mainly to practitioners, at first called Nachrichten für die Mitglieder des Deutschen Anwaltvereins and later simply Anwalts-blatt.

25. See for example, the statistics in Reichs-Justizministerium, , Deutsche Justiz-Statistik, vol. 17 (Berlin, 1915), Table IV, 2225.Google Scholar

26. See Ledford, From General Estate to Special Interest, Table 4.1.

27. The seminal work on the public sphere remains Habermas, Jürgen, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft (Darmstadt, 1964)Google Scholar, available in English as The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), in which he stresses the importance of associational life.

28. For a brief overview of the importance of voluntary associations to German middle-class life, see Dann, Otto, “Vereinsbildung in Deutschland in historischer Per-spektive” in Vereine in Deutschland. Vom Geheimbund zur freien gesellschaftlichen Organisation, ed. Best, Heinrich (Bonn, 1993), 119–42.Google Scholar

29. The number of lawyers in Germany expanded from 4,091 in 1880 to 6,800 in 1901, to 12,297 in 1913, to 18,036 in 1932; see Table A. 5a, “Increase in Attorneys: German Lawyers,” in Jarausch, The Unfree Professions, 238. See also Ledford, From General Estate to Special Interest, Table 4.1.

30. Lawyers regularly discussed any proposed revisions to procedural law and the lawyers' code in their biennial conventions, and the executive board of the DAV made formal submissions to the Imperial or Prussian Ministries of Justice; see for example Ostler, Die deutschen Rechtsanwälte, 39–46.

31. The definitive work on the liberal parties during Weimar is Jones, Larry Eugene, German Liberalism and the Dissolution of the Weimar Party System 1918–1933 (Chapel Hill, 1988).Google Scholar See also Langewiesche, Liberalismus in Deutschland, 240–86, and Table 16: Reichstagswahlen in der Weimarer Republik, 334.

32. Ostler, Die deutschen Rechtsanwülte, 87, 89, 200–201. The funds were called respectively Witwen- und Waisenkasse and Hülfskasse für Deutsche Rechtsanwdlte.

33. See the reports of the activities of the local funds in the province of Hannover recorded in the annual reports of the Anwaltskammer in Celle, Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Preuβischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin-Dahlem (G.St.A.), I HA Rep. 84a, Nr. 21912 and 21913, “Jahresberichte, Rechtsanwaltskammer Celle.” Healthy funds in smaller cities fell into extinction after the inflation of 1923.

34. Useful here is the historical outline provided in Cahn, Hugo, “Denkschrift des Bayerischen Anwaltsverbandes zur Herbeiführung einer Pensionsversicherung der Deutschen Anwaltschaft,” Anwaltsblatt 9 (1922): 92104, 92–96.Google Scholar

35. Ibid., 94.

36. Ibid., 94. The name of the voluntary fund was Ruhegehalts-, Witwen- und Wai-senkasse.

37. Ibid., 95–96; the resolution is also reprinted in the legislative justification for the draft insurance bill, “Das Versicherungsgesetz für Rechtsanwälte,” Anwaltsblatt 13 (1926): 31; on the Gröber resolution, see also Ostler, Die deutsche Rechtsanwälte, 120–22.

38. Cahn, “Denkschrift,” 95–96.

39. DrStrauder, , “Pensionsversicherung für Rechtsanwälte,” Anwaltsblatt 9 (1922): 3032.Google Scholar

40. Dr. Schweer, “Geldentwertung und Allgemeine Pensionskasse der Rechtsanwalt-schaft,” ibid.: 37–38.

41. “Aus der Vereinstätigkeit,” ibid. 10 (1923): 24–26, 25.

42. “Entwurf eines Gesetzes über die Pensionsversicherung der deutschen Rechtsanwalte. Nebst Erläuterungen. Aufgestellt vom Deutschen Anwaltverein Dezember 1923,” ibid. 11 (1924): 15–20.

43. Ibid.: 19.

44. “17. Vertreterversammlung des Deutschen Anwaltvereins,” ibid.: 59–64.

45. Ibid.: 62.

46. “Aus der Vereinstatigkeit,” ibid. 12 (1925): 32. The editorial staff of the Anwalts-blatt considered this novelty, inclusion of a free profession in a social insurance scheme, to be one of the strengths of the bill; “Die Aufgaben des Jahres 1926,” ibid. 13 (1926): 1–3, 2.

47. For the progress of the bill through the two ministries, see the reports “Aus der Vereinstätigkeit,” ibid. 12 (1925): 10 (Feb.); 17 (March); 32 (April); 97 (June); 145 (Nov.); 167 (Dec.).

48. See the complaints by the editor of the Anwaltsblatt and by other supporters of mandatory retirement insurance, arguing that the claims by the insurance companies were false; “Die Pensionsversicherung,” ibid. 12 (1925): 97–98, 97; “Pensionsversicherung,” ibid.: 115–16; Hugo Cahn, “Zwangspensionsgesetz und Lebensversicherung-sanstalt,” ibid.: 134–36; “Pensionsversicherung,” ibid.: 163.

49. The action of the executive committee was in 1925, I HA Rep. 84a, Nr. 21913, 235, and that of the plenary assembly in 1926, 1 HA Rep. 84a, Nr. 21913, 241 (“rejected by an overwhelming majority”).

50.Die 19. Vertreterversammlung,” Anwaltsblatt 13 (1926): 118.Google Scholar

51. Sect. 87 (later sect. 91) of the Code of Civil Procedure requires the losing party to bear all the costs of the successful party, including lawyers' fees.

52. The most comprehensive work on the history of courts of special jurisdiction for labor disputes is Wunderlich, Frieda, German Labor Courts (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1946).Google Scholar Ostler, Die deutsche Rechtsanwdlte, 39, discusses the attitude of the private bar toward creation of the industrial courts in 1890. The industrial courts are called in German Gewerbegerichte.

53. Bovensiepsen, , “Das Verbot der Zulassung von Rechtsanwalten vor den Gewerbeund Kaufmannsgerichten,” Juristische Wochenschrift 42 (1913): 729–30, 729.Google Scholar

54. Bendix, Ludwig, “Richter, Rechtsanwälte und Arbeitsgerichte,” Die Justiz 1 (19251926): 186–93Google Scholar, 187. See also the arguments in Schllcking, Lothar Engelbert, “Leitwort zur Verabschiedung des Arbeitsgerichtsgesetzes,” Die Justiz 2 (19261927): 273–77Google Scholar, directed at the fixation with formalities of the Civil Law Code and conceptual jurisprudence, which were inculcated in trained jurists at every stage of their training; Schücking expressed regret that private practitioners had to suffer in the greater struggle against the overly formal German legal system.

55. Ostler, Die deutschen Rechtsanwälte, 40–41.

56. The German term for commercial employment courts is Kaufmannsgerichte.

57. See the discussion at Wunderlich, German Labor Courts, 40, and Ostler, Die deutschen Rechtsanwälte, 179–81. The Weimar Constitution provided that the federal government should adopt a uniform labor code (Arbeitsrecht); Art. 157. The new courts were to be called Arbeitsgerichte.

58. “Zum Entwurf eines Arbeitsgerichtsgesetzes,” Anwaltsblatt 7 (1920): 210–11; see the descriptions of the efforts of the executive committee of the DAV in “Sitzung des Vorstandes des Deutschen Anwaltvereins vom 4. und 5. Dez. 1920” ibid. 7 (1920): 227–31, 227; and “Aus der Vereinstatigkeit,” ibid. 8 (1921): 3–5, 4. See “Aus der Vereinstatigkeit,” ibid. 9 (1922): 3–5, 3–4, outlining the position of the DAV taken in discussions with the Reich Ministry of Justice.

59. “Entwurf eines Arbeitsgerichtsgesetzes, insbesondere: die Angliederung der Son-dergerichte an die ordentliche Gerichte, Zulassung der Rechtsanwslte,” ibid.: 19–20, 20; resolution passed at the 14th Representatives' Assembly in Braunschweig, Jan. 28, 1922.

60. This attitude is accepted as axiomatic by Hugo Sinzheimer, “Zum Entwurf eines Arbeitsgerichtsgesetzes,” Die Justiz 1 (1925–26): 6–12, 8. See also Max Hachenburg's observations on this suspicion and hostility in Lebenserinnerungen eines Rechtsanwalts und Briefe aus der Emigration, ed. Schadt, Jürg (Stuttgart, 1978), 164.Google Scholar

61. Wunderlich, German Labor Courts, 55–56.

62. Ibid., 121; see the express lament by Dittenberger, Heinrich, “1927,” Anwaltsblatt 14 (1927): 13, 1.Google Scholar

63. Out of many examples, see Albert Engel, “Zum Entwurf eines Arbeitsgerichtsgesetzes,” ibid. 12 (1925): 152–56, 152, 153. For a description of the system created by the labor court law, see Davis, Horace B., “The German Labor Courts,” Political Science Quarterly 44 (1929): 397420CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and especially his examination of the exclusion of lawyers, in which he concludes that their admission would not make much difference as to comparative advantage between capital and labor but does not evaluate the issues of increased expense or delay. Ibid.: 414–16.

64. See the remarkable exchange between the DAV and the German Democratic Party (DDP), in which the DDP tried to undermine the claim of the German People's Party (DVP) that it supported the interests of lawyers in the whole episode; the DAV rejected the DDP's claims, noting that both parties failed to protect the interests of lawyers; “Zum Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz,” Anwaltsblatt 14 (1927): 57–58.

65. The pronoun “he” is accurate until 1922, for women were not admitted to practice in Germany until that year.

66. In 1880, there were only 165 district court lawyers in all of Germany (out of 4,091 total lawyers); by 1915, there were 3,123 out of a total of 13,051; Ledford, From General Estate to Special Interest, Table 7.2. District court lawyers chafed particularly at having to compete as equals with non-legally trained advisors (Rechtskonsulenten), whose social status fell far below that of university graduates.

67. The dispute over simultaneous admission filled the periodical literature of the practicing bar between 1903 and 1927, and the debate persisted even afterward. A complete, albeit partisan, history of the debate can be found at Amts-gerichtsanwälte, Verein Deutscher, e.V., ed., Simultanzulassung. Handbuch zum Reichsgesetz vom 7. März 1927 (Berlin, 1931)Google Scholar; see also Kenneth F. Ledford, “Conflict Within the Legal Profession: Simultaneous Admission and the German Bar 1903–1927,” in German Professions, 1800–1950, 252–69, and Ostler, Die deutschen Rechtsanwälte, 67–78. A valuable report is “Bericht des Referenten Justizrat Schatz, Leipzig,” Anlage B, in Anwaltverein, Deutscher, ed., Um die Simultanzulassung. Bericht über die Ausschuβverhandlungen im Deutschen Anwaltverein (Erster Teil) (Leipzig, 1925), 2243.Google Scholar

68. See the explanation for refusal to permit simultaneous admission provided by the Prussian Ministry of Justice to Chancellor Caprivi on May 23, 1894, G.St.A., I HA Rep. 84a, Nr. 10346, “Gesetzliche Ordnung der Verhältnisse des Anwalts- und Advokatenstandes, Bd. VI, 1888–1902,” 223–29. The justifications advanced by the Prussian Ministry of Justice never deviated substantially from this list.

69. For a summary of the arguments, see Reidnitz, Georg, Lokalisation und Simultanzulassung (Mainz, 1911).Google Scholar

70. Schatz, “Bericht,” 24. See also the petition by the Verein der Amtsgerichtsanwä1te des Oberlandesgerichtsbezirks Düsseldorf to the Reich Ministry of Justice, July 6, 1920, in G.St.A., I HA Rep. 84a, Nr. 71, “Gesetzliche Ordnung der Verhätnisse des Anwaltsund Advokatenstandes, Bd. XII, 1920–23,” 127–28, calling for the introduction of simultaneous admission.

71. The superior court lawyers sent an announcement of the formation of their association in Jena on May 22, 1921, to the Prussian Ministry of Justice; Verein Deutscher Landgerichtsanwälte to Prussian Ministry of Justice, June 2, 1921, G.St.A., I HA Rep. 84a, Nr. 71, 259–61. The purpose of the association is given as: “The safeguarding of the special professional interests of the German superior court bar and the protection of its professional relations as well as the promotion of legislation and the administration of justice.”

72. For examples, see the petitions reproduced in Verein Deutscher Amtsgerichtsanwälte, ed., Simultanzulassung, 193–315, and the submissions in G.St.A., I HA Rep. 84a, Nr. 71, 225–30, 307, Nr. 72, 571–85 and 589–607.

73. The DAV felt itself quite irrelevant to the final outcome of the dispute over simultaneous admission; see the account by Hachenburg, Lebenserinnerungen, 163.

74. One sidelight of the dispute was the struggle by district court lawyers for increased power both within the DAV and its institutions and the mandatory-membership lawyers' chambers, all of which, they were convinced, were disproportionately and unfairly dominated by superior court lawyers. See Ledford, From General Estate to Special Interest, chap. 4.

75. “Aus der Vereinstätigkeit,” Anwaltsblatt 8 (1921): 3–5, 3–4. The submission by the DAV to the Saxon government is reprinted at ibid., 19–21.

76. “Aus der Vereinstätigkeit,” ibid.: 104–7, 105–6; the DAV indicated that it would rely upon local bar associations to combat introduction of the trade tax on lawyers in their states.

77. Wassertrüdinger (Nürnberg), “Gewerbesteuer vom Anwaltseinkommen?” ibid.: 182–84, 184, which uses for “professional morality” the term “Standessitte.”

78. “Aus der Vereinstätigkeit,” ibid. 16 (1929): 76–80, 78.

79. “Aus der Vereinstätigkeit,” ibid.: 116–18, 116–17; over fifteen hundred professionals attended the Berlin protest.

80. Ibid.: 117; the Social Democrats and Wirtschaftspartei voted unanimously for the law, the DNVP and National Socialists unanimously against it; the Center voted 54 for, 3 against; DVP 14 for, 24 against; DDP 6 for, 14 against.

81. “Vereinsnachrichten,” ibid. 17 (1930): 97–100, 99.

82. For lawyers' arguments as to why they should not be included in the tax, see Marcuse, Paul, Die freien Berufe und die Gewerbesteuer (Leipzig, 1929)Google Scholar, and idem, “Die preuβische Gewerbesteuer,” Anwaltsblatt 17 (1930): 116–20.

83. Ostler, Die deutschen Rechtsanwälte, 208; see also “Die Abwälzung der Gewerbesteuer,” Anwaltsblatt 17 (1930): 174–76; by June 15, 1930, fifty-four local bar associations had adopted “pass through” provisions. The device of uniform surcharge tariffs was a reversion to wartime and inflation devices that permitted fees to keep pace with inflation through self-help measures without resort to legislation.

84. See the exchange of letters between the Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie and the DAV in May 1930, ibid.: 175–76, which termed compliance with the surcharge a “Standespflicht.” As to the outlawing of the policy, see Ostler, Die deutschen Rechtsanwälte, 209.

85. “Preuβische Gewerbesteuer,” Anwaltsblatt 17 (1930): 227.

86. “Aus der Vereinstätigkeit,” ibid. 18 (1931): 172–74, 173.

87. “Aus der Vereinstätigkeit,” ibid. 19 (1932): 229–30, 229; the opinion is reprinted at Juristische Wochenschrift 61 (1932): 2113.

88. Especially useful here is Flieβ, Edith, Der Kampf um den numerus clausus in der Rechtsanwaltschaft (Dr. jur. diss., Freiburg i. B., 1933)Google Scholar; see also Ostler, Die deutschen Rechtsanwälte, 59–68, 213–16, and Krach, Jüdische Rechtsanwälte, 40–76. For the consistent fears of overcrowding of the legal profession, see Kolbeck, Thomas, Juristenschwemmen. Untersuchungen über den juristischen Arbeitsmarkt im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt, 1978).Google Scholar See also Titze, Hartmut, “Die zyklische Überproduktion von Akademikern im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 10 (1984): 92121.Google Scholar

89. For the circular inquiries of the Prussian Ministry of Justice to the presidents of each Oberlandesgericht inquiring as to whether the practicing bar was overcrowded, see G.St.A., I HA Rep. 84a, Nr. 36, “Revision der Rechtsanwaltsordnung,” 33–40 (April 11, 1885) and 67–90 (March 19, 1894). Krach, Jüdische Rechtsanwälte, 41, mentions only the circular of 1894.

90. “Verhandlungen des XII. deutschen Anwaltstag zu Stuttgart,” Juristische Wochenschrift 23 (1894), Beilage zu Nr. 55; and “Verhandlungen des XX. deutschen Anwaltstages zu Würzburg,” ibid. 40 (1911), Zugabe zu Nr. 20, 50. See also Ledford, From General Estate to Special Interest, chap. 8.

91. For a useful survey of the perception and reality of overcrowding in the academic professions during the Weimar Republic, see Beatus, Morris, “Academic Proletariat: The Problem of Overcrowding in the Learned Professions and Universities during the Weimar Republic 1918–1933” (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1975).Google Scholar For a briefer summary, see Kotschnig, Walter M., Unemployment in the Learned Professions: An International Study of Occupational and Educational Planning (Oxford, 1937), 117–21.Google Scholar

92. Feuchtwanger, Sigbert, Die freien Berufe. Im besonderen: Die Anwaltschaft. Versuch einer allgemeinen Kulturwirtschaftslehre (Munich and Leipzig, 1922), 150–51.Google Scholar

93. The concept of an “upper class of lawyers” stemmed from Rumpf, Max, Anwalt und Anwaltstand. Eine rechtswissenschaftliche und rechtssoziologische Untersuchung (Leipzig, 1926) 3132.Google Scholar The idea of their remoteness from the day-to-day struggle of the younger, rank-and-file lawyers was elaborated by Bauer-Mengelberg, Rudolf, Standesgefühl und Solidaritläsgefühl gesehen von der Psychologie des jungen Anwalts (Leipzig, 1929), 5859Google Scholar; he repeated this claim that the leadership was out of touch with the economic concerns of the average lawyer in “Die Abgeordneten,” Anwaltsblatt 18 (1931): 237–40, especially 238, accusing the leaders of the DAV of being “unrepresentative.”

94. ; “Vereinigungen. Deutscher Anwaltverein,” Juristische Wochenschrift 57 (1928): 3094–95. The assembly defeated the rejection of all limitations by a vote of 61 to 56; it defeated a call for a waiting period by Assessoren by 68 to 49 and for a numerus clausus for Referendare by 64 to 52 (with 1 abstention). “Stenographischer Bericht über die 22. Abgeordnetenversammlung vom 3. und 4. November 1928 im Hotel ‘Frankfurter Hof’ zu Frankfurt a.M.,” Anwaltsblatt 16 (1929), Beilage zu Heft 2, 115–18.

95. “Beschlüsse der 25. Abgeordnetenversammlung des Deutschen Anwaltvereins vom 22. und 23. März 1930 zu Leipzig,” Juristische Wochenschrift 59 (1930): 1036. The vote to control overcrowding by limitations upon admission was 65 to 50. “Stenographischer Bericht über die 25. Abgeordnetenversammlung vom 22. und 23. März zu Leipzig,” Anwaltsblatt 17 (1930), Beilage zu Heft 6, 99–102; the vote to adopt the numerus clausus for Referendare was 63 to 52, ibid., 102. Max Hachenburg noted with surprise that the chief proponents of the numerus clausus came not from the large cities, where the overcrowding was most pronounced, but from medium and smaller districts; “Juristische Rundschau,” Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung 35 (1930): 539–44, 542.

96. The votes on the three-year freeze were 127 to 19 in favor; on the numerus clausus, 115 to 31 in favor; “Stenographischer Bericht über die 29. Abgeordnetenversammlung von 4. Dezember 1932 zu Berlin,” Anwaltsblatt 20 (1933), Beilage zu Heft 3, 70–72. See also the address to the assembly by Hodenberg, Freiherr Hodo von, “Lage und Schicksal der deutschen Anwaltschaft. Bericht, erstattet der 29. Abgeordnetenversammlung des Deutschen Anwaltvereins in Berlin am 4. Dezember 1932,” Juristische Wochenschrift 61 (1932)Google Scholar, Beilage zu Nr. 51/52, 7. Von Hodenberg did not minimize the objections against the numerus clausus, but he advocated it as the only possible means to avert impending catastrophe; the danger of political interference by the government in the selection process for lawyers posed no greater threat with a numerus clausus for lawyers than with one for Referendare, which had already been endorsed in 1930; he concluded: “Gentlemen, we have progressively and as the result of economic extremity had to disabuse ourselves of numerous lawyerly objections” to such measures. Krach, Jüdische Rechtsanwälte, 46–49, recounts this climactic meeting and considers it the end of the bar's ability to resist National Socialist race policies, 60, 74.

97. Krach, Jüdische Rechtsanwälte, quotes Erich Eyck, who attributed the endorsement of the numerus clausus to the permanent “injury to [the bar's] interests caused by the legislation of recent years,” specifically mentioning exclusion from labor courts and imposition of the trade tax (n. 3).

98. The classic work on German social insurance remains Dawson, W. H., Social Insurance in Germany 1883–1911: Its History, Operation, Results (New York, 1913).Google Scholar For a history of social policy toward the poor, see also Steinmetz, George, Regulating the Social: The Welfare State and Local Politics in Imperial Germany (Princeton, 1993).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

99. For a description of the Honoratiorenorganisation, see Nipperdey, Thomas, “Verein als soziale Struktur im späten 18. und frühen 19. Jahrhundert,” in Geschichtswissenschaft und Vereinswesen im 19. Jahrhundert, ed. Boockmann, Hartmut, et al. (Göttingen, 1972), 144.Google Scholar For example, sect. 8 of the bylaws (Geschäftsordnung) of the lawyers' chamber in Celle required that the chairman and secretary of the executive board “shall regularly be elected from among the members of the chamber living at the seat of the chamber,” that is, from among the court of appeal lawyers in Celle. G.St.A. I HA Rep. 84a, Nr. 21912, 9–27.

100. Although the story of the social diversification of the bar is complex, it may be summarized as an increase in the proportion of sons of businessmen and university-trained professionals other than lawyers and a decrease in the proportion of sons of lawyers and government officials, especially in district court towns and large cities; see Ledford, From General Estate to Special Interest, Tables 5.3–5.6.

101. The parallel to the analysis of the fate of the liberal parties is striking; see the conclusion in Jones, German Liberalism, 476–82.

102. See for example the lament that “only 11 ‘practicing’ lawyers sit in the Reichstag out of 469 delegates;” Julius Curtius, “Anwaltschaft und Parlament,” Juristische Wochenschrift 51 (1922): 1289–91, 1289. Curtius then surveys the number of lawyers in the legislatures of other countries and finds them better-represented everywhere. See also the complaints about too few lawyers in the Reichstag in “1927,” Anwaltsblatt 14 (1927): 1–2, 2, and “Aus der Vereinstatigkeit,” ibid. 19 (1932): 188–91, 189–90 (only 14 out of 560 deputies in the just-dissolved Reichstag). For the centrality of political activity and parliamentary service to the self-conception of lawyers in France during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Karpik, Lucien, “Lawyers and Politics in France, 1814–1950: The State, the Market, and the Public,” Law and Social Inquiry 13 (1988): 707–36, 719–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

103. von Strandmann, Hartmut Pogge, “The Liberal Power Monopoly in the Cities of Imperial Germany,” in Elections, Mass Politics, and Social Change in Modern Germany: New Perspectives, ed. Jones, Larry Eugene and Retallack, James (Cambridge, 1992), 93117CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hardtwig, Wolfgang, “Groβstadt und Bürgerlichkeit in der politischen Ordnung des Kaiserreichs,” in Stadt und Bürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert, ed. Gall, Lothar (Munich, 1990), 1964.Google Scholar