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Voters’ ideological stances have long been considered one of the most important factors for understanding electoral choices in Chile. In recent years, however, the literature has begun to call this premise into question, due to several changes in the Chilean political landscape: the current crisis of representation, the high programmatic congruence between the two main coalitions, the decline in the political relevance of the dictatorship, and the rise of nonprogrammatic electoral strategies. In addition to these transformations, Chile switched to voluntary voting in 2012. This article studies whether ideology still informs electoral choices in Chile in an era of voluntary voting. It implements a conjoint survey experiment in low-to-middle-income neighborhoods in Santiago, where voters would be expected to be less ideological. It shows that candidates’ ideological labels are crucial for understanding the electoral decisions of a large part of the sample, particularly among likely voters.
High levels of crime are a key driver of emigration from Latin America and the Caribbean. But can emigration change public opinion about how best to respond to crime? Focusing on the political economy of remittances—the money migrants send to their families and communities—this study argues that emigration can increase support for violent responses to crime. Migrants’ families often spend remittances on investment goods, which makes them more vulnerable to crime and more supportive of violence to protect themselves. An analysis of AmericasBarometer data finds that remittance recipients are more likely both to fear crime and to be victims of crime than nonrecipients. They are also more approving of vigilantism, more tolerant of police bending the law to apprehend criminals, and more supportive of deploying the military in crime fighting. These findings contribute to our knowledge of the consequences of international migration for political development in migrant-sending countries.
This study seeks to explain the rise and performance of “segmented neocorporatism” in Uruguay in light of contemporary theories of wage coordination, largely framed by the Varieties of Capitalism school and its recent critics. First it argues that the legacy of a centralized labor law framework, and a unified union movement, combined with Frente Amplio’s decisive labor empowerment from above to launch neocorporatist wage coordination in the period 2005–10. Second, it analyzes the stabilization of the coordinated model in 2013–19, in times of sluggish growth and labor tensions, evinced in the control of inflation pressures and social conflict. The article concludes that the macroeconomic combination of supply-side and Keynesian policies and the inclusion of precarious workers shaped an egalitarian version of corporatism with important challenges ahead.
According to conventional wisdom, closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) electoral systems create incentives for legislators to favor the party line over their voters’ positions. However, electoral incentives may induce party leaders to tolerate “shirking” by some legislators, even under CLPR. This study argues that in considering whose deviations from the party line should be tolerated, party leaders exploit differences in voters’ relative electoral influence resulting from malapportionment. We expect defections in roll call votes to be more likely among legislators elected from overrepresented districts than among those from other districts. We empirically test this claim using data on Argentine legislators’ voting records and a unique dataset of estimates of voters’ and legislators’ placements in a common ideological space. Our findings suggest that even under electoral rules known for promoting unified parties, we should expect strategic defections to please voters, which can be advantageous for the party’s electoral fortunes.
Recent years have seen the rapid passage and modification of family leave policies in Latin America, a surprising trend, given the region’s historically conservative gender norms. This article argues that the rise of new paternity leave policies—as well as the modifications to longer-standing maternity leave policies—reflects contending visions of gender and the family, mediated by the institutions and actors that populate the region’s political landscape. Using an original dataset of family policy measures, this article finds that the factors facilitating the adoption of new, vanguard policies, such as paternity leave, function in ways different from those that shape the expansion of longer-standing policies, including maternity leave.
How do individuals’ fairness judgments aﬀect their political evaluations? This article argues that when citizens perceive high levels of distributive unfairness in society, they will be less satisfied with the way democracy functions. Yet good governance—that is, impartiality in the exercise of political authority—should mitigate the negative inﬂuence of perceived distributive unfairness on satisfaction. Using a cross-national analysis of 18 Latin American countries from 2011 to 2015, this study demonstrates that individuals are significantly less satisfied with democracy when they perceive their country’s income distribution as unfair. Yet good governance significantly oﬀsets this negative relationship, even in a region with the highest level of inequality in the world. These findings imply that policymakers can bolster democratic satisfaction, even in places where citizens perceive the income distribution as fundamentally unfair, by committing to good governance and fair democratic procedures.