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Appearances and Things in Themselves: Actuality and Identity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 2016

Nicholas F. Stang
Nicholas F. Stang*
Affiliation:
University of Toronto
*
Email: nick.stang@gmail.com
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Abstract

Lucy Allais’s anti-phenomenalist interpretation of transcendental idealism is incomplete in two ways. First of all, like some phenomenalists, she is committed to denying the coherence of claims of numerical identity of appearances and things in themselves. Secondly, she fails to explain adequately what grounds the actuality of appearances. This opens the door to a phenomenalist understanding of appearances.

Keywords

KantAllaistranscendental idealismphenomenalismidentityactualityexistenceexperience
Type
Author Meets Critics
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 21 , Issue 2 , July 2016 , pp. 283 - 292
Copyright
© Kantian Review 2016 

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References

Allais, Lucy (2015) Manifest Reality: Kant’s Idealism and his Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kant, Immanuel (2008) Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. and ed. P. Guyer and A. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Stang, Nicholas (2015) ‘Kant’s Argument that Existence is Not a Determination’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 91(3), 583–626.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stang, Nicholas (2016a) Kant’s Modal Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stang, Nicholas (2016b) ‘Kant’s Transcendental Idealism’. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016 Edition). Ed. Edward N. Zalta. URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/kant-transcendental-idealism/>..>Google Scholar