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Reply to Edward Kanterian

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 June 2013

Graham Bird*
Affiliation:
University of Manchester Email: grabird80@yahoo.co.uk

Abstract

The reply to Kanterian offers a rebuttal of his central criticisms. It reaffirms the difference between Kant's arguments in the Aesthetic and at B 148-9; it rejects the alleged error of logic in Fischer's (and my) arguments; and it rejects Kanterian's reading of passages in the Preface (A xx-xxii) and of the Amphiboly. Beyond these specific points Kanterian assumes that Kant's project in the first Critique cannot be understood as a ‘descriptive metaphysics’ and so begs the question at issue.

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Kantian Review 2013 

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References

Bird, Graham (2003) ‘Kant's and Strawson's Descriptive Metaphysics’. In Hanjo Glock (ed.), Strawson and Kant (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 6786.Google Scholar
Bird, Graham (2006) The Revolutionary Kant. Chicago and La Salle, IL: Open Court.Google Scholar
Bird, Graham (2010) A Companion to Kant (paperback edn. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell).Google Scholar
Bennett, Jonathan (1966) Kant's Analytic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
James, William (1912) Essays in Radical Empiricism. London: Longmans Green.Google Scholar
James, William (1918) The Principles of Psychology. London: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Strawson, P. F. (1959) Individuals. London: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Strawson, P. F. (1966) The Bounds of Sense. London: Methuen.Google Scholar
Strawson, P.F. (1985) Skepticism and Naturalism. London: Methuen.Google Scholar
Stroud, Barry (1984) The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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Reply to Edward Kanterian
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