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Kant on the Independence of the Moral Law from Sensibility

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2015

Laura Papish*
Affiliation:
George Washington University
*Corresponding

Abstract

There are several senses in which Kant’s moral law is independent of sensibility. This paper is devoted mainly to Kant’s account of ‘physical conditions independence’, or the idea that the moral law can compel us to pursue ends that might be impossible to realize empirically. Since this idea has received little attention from commentators, this paper addresses both its textual basis in Kant’s writings and its overall philosophical viability.

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Articles
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© Kantian Review 2015 

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