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Accessing the Moral Law through Feeling

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 June 2015

Owen Ware
Affiliation:
Simon Fraser University
Corresponding
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Abstract

In this article I offer a critical commentary on Jeanine Grenberg’s claim that, by the time of the second Critique, Kant was committed to the view that we only access the moral law’s validity through the feeling of respect. The issue turns on how we understand Kant’s assertion that our consciousness of the moral law is a ‘fact of reason’. Grenberg argues that all facts must be forced, and anything forced must be felt. I defend an alternative interpretation, according to which the fact of reason refers to the actuality of our moral consciousness.

Type
Critical Exchange
Copyright
© Kantian Review 2015 

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References

Allison, Henry (1990) Kant’s Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grenberg, Jeanine (2013) Kant’s Defense of Common Moral Experience: A Phenomenological Account. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heidegger, Martin (1988) The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Trans. Alfred Hofstadter. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.Google Scholar
Kant, Immanuel (1999) Practical Philosophy. Ed. and trans. Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Kant, Immanuel (2009) Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Schönecker, Dieter (2013) ‘Kant’s Moral Intuitionism: The Fact of Reason and Moral Predispositions’. Kant Studies Online <www.kantstudiesonline.net/KSO_Date_13_files/SchoneckerDieter00213.pdf>, 138.Google Scholar
Ware, Owen (2010) ‘Kant, Skepticism, and Moral Sensibility’. University of Toronto (dissertation thesis).Google Scholar
Ware, Owen (2014a) ‘Kant on Moral Sensibility and Moral Motivation’. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 52, 727746.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ware, Owen (2014b) ‘Rethinking Kant’s Fact of Reason’. Philosophers’ Imprint, 14, 121.Google Scholar
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