Man's moral responsibility for his actions is a tenet of Islamic revelation which no Muslim has ever tried to reject. Likewise, the notion of God's omnipotence, which the Qur'ān teaches, has never been challenged by Muslims. However, there is a great difficulty in explaining how true moral responsibility coincides with God's omnipotence; if God creates all things, He also creates man's actions, and this being the case, man cannot be responsible for them. As is well known, the Mu'tazilite solution to the antinomy of God's omnipotence and man's responsibility consists in affirming man's capability, granted to him by God, of creating his own works. Adhering to their principle of God's justice, the Mu'tazilites asserted that if God were to create a man's unbelief while commanding him to believe, He would be unjust in punishing him for unbelief, since the man could not, in this situation, help but disbelieve. According to them, ought implies can. In upholding man's responsibility for his own actions, the Mu'tazilites saved God's justice, but according to the Ash'arites, detracted from God's omnipotence. The Ash'arites taught that since God is the sole creator, He creates human actions. In order to safeguard both God's omnipotence and man's responsibility, al-Ash'arī, having been influenced by the teaching of al-Najjār, developed a theory of kasb (lit. acquisition) according to which God creates man's actions while man appropriates them and thus becomes responsible for them.

In his description of the excellent city (Kitāb al-siyāsat al-madaniyah and 'Ārā ahl al-madīnah al-fāḍilah), al-Fārābī mentions those citizens who are not philosophers, but rather the opponents of the principles of their community. To these groups, of which several are enumerated al-Fārābī refers either as “the rest” (al-Bāqūn), or, “al-Nawābit”. It is this group, and in particular this name, that is intriguing, for although on the face of it it carries no politico-religious significance at all, some conclusions that touch upon these fields may be drawn by scrutinizing it. I would like to show that al-Fārābī abstracted the private name of the Nawābit and gave it the meaning of “opposition”. In order to do this I will analyze his use of the name along the following lines: first a short survey of the lexical usage of the root nbt; then I will show that the Nawābit were regarded by al-Fārābī as oppositional; then that they belong to the excellent cities; that their description entails all areas of political activity; that al-Fārābī was aware of the meaning of the name; that he used it in an abstract manner and the reasons for his choosing this particular name for “opposition”. Secondly I will show the earlier use of the name by a real historical group, and finally its later use by Ibn Bājjah

Midway through his account of the fortunes of the Barmakids in his Murūj aldhahab wa-ma'ādin al-jawhar, al-Masʽūdī (d. 956) introduces a debate on love said to have taken place in the majlis of Yaḥyā ibn Khālid al-Barmakī. Yaḥyā, described as a man of great learning devoted to philosophical discussion, invited the theologians who frequented his salon, and who had previously debated on a variety of philosophical and theological topics, “to speak of love ['ishq], without disputing, each presenting whatever occurs to him as it comes to his mind”. A number of definitions are offered, followed by additional comments by Mas'ūdī; the whole constitutes a substantial digression which intervenes between the depiction of the Barmakids at the height of their power and the account of their fall from favour.

Two important contemporary authors provide primary sources for the history of Qalāwūn's reign. The first of these, Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ʽAbd al-Ẓahir, had been the head of Baybars's chancery, and continued to hold office, possibly until his death in 692/1293. He was, however, overtaken during his lifetime by his son, Fatḥ al-Dīn, whom Qalāwūn appointed to the new post of confidential secretary (kātib al-sirr). Muḥyī al-Dīn was the author of Baybars's official biography, a Rawḍ al-zāhirfisirat al-Malik al-Ẓāhir – indeed one might say that he ghosted the memoirs recounted to him by the sultan. In due course he also produced the official biography of Qalāwūn, Tashrlf al-ayyām wa 'l-'uṣūr fi sīrat al-Malik al-Manṣūr, of which unfortunately only the latter part, beginning with the year 680/1281–82, is now extant. A great deal of the value of this work lies in the state papers it transmits. These include the texts of truces with the Templars, Acre, Lesser Armenia, and the Lady Margaret of Tyre, as well as treaties (also formally truces in Islamic international law) with Aragon and Genoa.

The following contribution is based on several assumptions: First, it is assumed that the oral traditions of verbal art, whether “fixed” in writing/print or not, belong legitimately to the bulk of a national literature; second, it is assumed that such oral traditions have been grossly neglected, misunderstood and/or misinterpreted; third, when speaking of a “tradition”, what I have in mind is not an authoritative dogmatism based on set doctrines, but a fountain-source from which stems a continuous stream of thought and culture, irrespective of whether it is orally transmitted, or fixed in literary texts.

It has often been asserted that Tibetan society and culture were (in recent times at least) unadaptable, unchanging and set in an outworn mould. This kind of assertion has been made both by those who employ it to prop up a claim to superiority and overlordship over the Tibetans and by poorly informed writers with scanty knowledge of the people, language and history of Tibet and hence of what they are purporting to write about. This book assembles much evidence to show that Tibetans, their society and their culture were by no means as unchanging as some have either chosen to maintain or have been led to believe.